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ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND CORPORATE FINANCE
Tao Li
This dissertation consists of two distinct chapters. In the first chapter, I study the outsourc-
ing of corporate governance to proxy advisory firms, which are third-party advisors that help
institutional investors decide which way to vote on corporate governance issues. Advising
equity assets in trillions of dollars, these advisors play a powerful role in shaping corporate
governance. First, I model how conflicts of interest arise when a proxy advisor provides
advisory services to investors as well as consulting services to corporations on the same
governance issues. The advisor can issue biased voting recommendations when expected
reputation costs are low, compared to consulting fees. I then study how increased competi-
tion can alleviate these conflicts. Using a unique dataset on voting recommendations, I show
that the entry of a new advisory firm reduces favorable recommendations for management
proposals by the incumbent advisor. This is consistent with our theory as the incumbent
is subject to conflicts of interest by serving both investors and corporations. These results
inform the policy debate on whether and how to regulate the proxy advisory industry.
The second chapter of the thesis assesses the value of access to public transportation in
Beijing, a megacity suffering from severe traffic congestion. Existing urban economic theory
states that traffic congestion is welfare reducing. In practice, policymakers in congested
cities invest heavily in public transit systems to reduce transportation costs. However, not
all public transit modes are created equal – those that help alleviate traffic congestion are
the most desirable. Using a unique panel dataset of Beijing’s residential properties on sale
between 2003 and 2005, I find strong evidence that traffic delays translate into lower housing
prices, confirming that congestion is costly. Moreover, I show that announcements of metro
line construction inflate prices of properties near future stations, and the increase is even
more staggering for more congested areas. This suggests that metro lines are expected to
reduce adverse impacts of congestion. However, additional bus routes are not capitalized
into prices because buses move slowly in the gridlocked city, often exacerbating rather than
alleviating congestion. These findings suggest that the overall quantity of public transit
services does not necessarily increase welfare.
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Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts
of Interest and Competition in the Proxy Ad-
visory Industry
1.1 Introduction
A proxy advisor is a third-party advisory firm that helps institutional shareholders decide
which way to vote on corporate issues. For a fee,1 this advisor provides independent proxy
research2 and voting recommendations. Some advisors also provide voting platforms for
their institutional clients. The proxy advisory industry has grown exponentially over the
past 25 years due to a convergence of market and regulatory developments, and a steady
1Most institutional investors subscribe to proxy advisory services on an annual basis.
2Sometimes referred to as proxy analysis, proxy research involves analyzing proxy statements and financial
statements of public companies, as well as multiple external original research sources to evaluate board
effectiveness and corporate governance risk profiles. It allows institutional investors to understand governance
risk within portfolio companies and take appropriate voting action.
2growth in institutional equity ownership3 has substantially increased these investors’ voting
power as well as their obligations. However, they often lack proper incentives4 or necessary
expertise to do research in order to make informed votes. Many institutional investors rely
on the advice of proxy advisory firms. Increased shareholder activism after the dot-com bust
further increased demand for governance advice and proxy voting.
In 2003, the SEC adopted rules that require mutual funds to publicly disclose their vot-
ing records, as well as adopt policies to ensure that they vote proxies in the best interests
of clients, which triggered a sharp increase in demand for proxy advisory services. Recent
changes in financial regulation have further accentuated impacts of proxy votes and influ-
ences of the proxy advisory industry. These changes include (1) a shift towards majority
voting for directors, (2) the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements on advisory vote on executive
compensation (“say-on-pay” vote), (3) the elimination of broker discretionary voting5 in
uncontested director elections, and on executive compensation matters.
While the importance of a viable proxy advisory industry is clear, the provision of ac-
curate proxy research and recommendations is complicated by peculiar industry features.
First, this industry is dominated by only two firms – Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.
(ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis) – with Glass Lewis gaining prominence only in
the past several years. Second, and perhaps most importantly, proxy advisors’ business mod-
3In the U.S., institutional investors have become the dominant players in the stock market, owning 50.6%
of total equity outstanding, and 73% of the largest 1,000 US companies at the end of 2009 (Tonello and
Rabimov, 2010). These investors include mutual funds, public and private pension funds, hedge funds and
other fiduciaries. Retail investors usually do not bother to vote for company policies.
4An institutional investor usually holds a diversified portfolio. Its stake in a particular company is
typically small, and how it votes is unlikely to affect vote outcomes. As one investor put it, “[researching
proxy voting issues] does not add a lot of value in terms of making [clients] money...” (see Bew and Fields,
2012).
5For most routine proposals, brokers once were allowed to vote on behalf of their retail investors in
“street name” (broker discretionary votes or broker non-votes). Research finds that brokers historically voted
uninstructed shares in accordance with management’s recommendation (see Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1994;
Bethel and Gillan, 2002). The SEC has recently prohibited broker discretionary voting as required by the
Dodd-Frank Act.
3els suffer from conflicts of interest. For example, ISS provides services to both institutional
investors and corporate issuers on the same governance issues, potentially creating ample
opportunities for making biased voting recommendations. Third, the extent of inaccuracies
and lack of transparency in proxy analyses coupled with limited engagement with issuers,
have raised concerns among industry experts and securities regulators.
These features of the industry have raised questions about the quality of proxy research
and recommendations provided by these prominent players. In particular, a consensus has
developed among policymakers and academics as to potential benefits of increasing compe-
tition among proxy advisors as a tool for improving quality. For example, SEC’s July 2010
concept release on the U.S. proxy system explicitly asked “whether these issues are affected
– and if so, how – by the fact that there is one dominant proxy advisory firm in the market-
place, Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’), whose long-standing position, according to
the Government Accountability Office, ‘has been cited by industry analysts as a barrier to
competition.”’
Although the argument for increased competition has gained traction, its theoretical
and empirical merits are not at all well established. Recent research on the credit ratings
industry,6 a similar information intermediary market,7 sheds light on why the role of compe-
tition needs to be better understood. A growing body of literature (see Bolton, Freixas and
Shapiro, 2012; Becker and Milbourn, 2011) has shown that competition among credit rat-
6There are a number of parallels between the credit ratings industry and the proxy advisory industry.
These common features include (1) various conflicts of interest (see footnote 9 for details), (2) a lack of
competition due to barrier of entry, (3) a lack of transparency in decision making, and potential inaccuracies.
However, their fundamental business models are different. Credit ratings agencies use an issuer-pay model
– the bulk of their ratings-related income comes from issuers whose products they rate (see White, 2002).
Proxy advisory firms, on the other hand, adopt a buyer-pay model that their principal revenue stream comes
from investors who purchase their services.
7According to Rose (1999), an information intermediary is “an independent, profit maximizing economic
information processing system performing its activities (information acquisition, processing, and dissemina-
tion) on behalf of other agents’ information needs.”
4ings agencies actually contributes to ratings inflation and lower consumer surplus, contrary
to the popular perception that competition improves ratings quality. In the issuer-pay busi-
ness model adopted by ratings agencies, corporate issuers can shop for better credit ratings.
In equilibrium, credit ratings agencies may loosen their standards for fear of revenue loss. A
careful study of the role of competition among proxy advisors thus is warranted.
This is the first paper that examines effects of increased competition in the proxy advisory
industry. Heightened competition is found to have reduced favorable recommendations for
management proposals by ISS, the incumbent advisor widely believed to suffer from conflicts
of interest arising from serving both shareholders and corporate issuers. This stands in
sharp contrast to the role competition plays among credit ratings agencies. In the buyer-pay
model adopted by proxy advisory firms, institutional investors now have an outside option
(a competitor’s reports) generated by competition (see Hörner, 2002). The existence of a
competitor, especially when it is perceived as less conflicted, can discipline the incumbent
advisor. Given this competitor’s reports, investors may make a more informed guess about
incumbent’s truthfulness.
I begin this study by developing a model to analyze strategic behavior of a proxy advisor
that sells investors a report on a management proposal, as well as consulting services to
the management. I look at different market structures (monopoly and competition from a
new entrant that sells only proxy reports) where proxy advisors obtain noisy information
about the proposal’s quality and issue reports to communicate the information. A central
innovation of this model is how it captures demand for proxy advisory services. Investors
may be either litigation-averse, in which case they follow the incumbent proxy advisor to
avoid lawsuits from their clients in the case of a wrong vote, or rational, in which case
they understand the structure of the game and can find out the advisors’ incentives. The
information reported is non-verifiable, but proxy advisors may suffer reputation costs (e.g.,
loss of future business) for misleading investors. This model shows that under monopoly, the
5incumbent advisor tends to inflate quality of the proposal when its expected reputation cost
is low, compared to the consulting fee. Because of the disciplinary effect under competition
(a higher probability of getting caught for issuing biased recommendations), the incumbent
advisor is likely to be more truthful than under monopoly.
Before empirically analyzing potential conflicts of interest and the role of competition
in reducing these conflicts, I provide evidence concerning proxy advisors’ influence on vote
outcomes. A major concern regarding conflicts of interest is that if biased recommendations
translate into actual votes, shareholder value may be adversely affected. I show that en-
dorsement by either of the dominant advisors, ISS or Glass Lewis, substantially increased
the percent of “For” votes for management proposals, independent of ballot types and firm
characteristics. This finding is consistent with prior research (see Choi, Fisch and Kahan,
2010; Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch, 2012). On the other hand, when these two advisors give
conflicting recommendations, a proposal receives fewer favorable votes. Interestingly, as com-
petition began to heat up, the ability of ISS’s recommendations to predict vote outcomes
diminished, while Glass Lewis became more influential. One plausible explanation is that
investors were increasingly following Glass Lewis’s recommendations, as it established itself
as an alternative to ISS. The purpose of this exercise is to show that advisory firms can
play an important role in shareholder voting, rather than claiming any causal relationship
between voting recommendations and vote outcomes. In practice, investors may select a
proxy advisor due to prior agreement with the advisor’s governance philosophy.
A key contribution of this paper is to show empirically that increased competition brought
by Glass Lewis’s entry into the proxy market has reduced ISS’s favoritism to corporate
managers. Since entering the market in early 2003, Glass Lewis has grown into a credible
competitor of ISS, capturing a market share of over 40% in 2011, measured by client assets
(see Figure 1.1). Empirically, I use two methods to measure potential effects of competition.
First, I examine whether or not there was a convergence of recommendations at the firm
6level when Glass Lewis was achieving a higher market share. Glass Lewis does not provide
consulting services to corporate issuers, and is thus widely considered to be less conflicted.
With more institutional shareholders subscribing to both companies, ISS’s recommenda-
tions would be under intense scrutiny. It would potentially react to market pressure and
engage in more truthtelling. This would increase the correlation between ISS’s recommen-
dations and Glass Lewis’s. I find that the firm-level spread between ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s
“For” recommendations shrank as Glass Lewis’s market share increased, indicating that
with Glass Lewis’s entry, ISS was more likely to switch from making “For” recommendations
to “Against/Withhold” than from making “Against/Withhold” recommendations to “For”.
To identify the direction of changes, I show that with a 10 percentage points increase in
Glass Lewis’s market share, the fraction of differing recommendations (ISS recommended
“For,” Glass Lewis recommended “Against/Withhold”) indeed went down by 6 percentage
points for the period 2004-2011. However, the fraction of differing recommendations (ISS
recommended “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis recommended “For”) dropped by only 1
percentage point. These results suggest that competition had a disciplinary effect of making
ISS less friendly to corporations.
Second, I look at how ISS’s recommendations for a company changed when Glass Lewis
began to cover it for the first time. When Glass Lewis (or any other proxy advisor) obtains a
new institutional client, it has to cover all portfolio firms of the client. Prior to establishing
the relationship, however, Glass Lewis does not know which companies are in the client’s
portfolio. Thus the event that Glass Lewis began to cover a new company served as an
exogenous shock to ISS’s recommendations for that company. I find that when Glass Lewis
began to cover a company for the first time, ISS’s average “For” recommendations for its
management proposals dropped by 1.9-2.3%.
This order of magnitude seems small because it is the effect of competition on ISS’s
recommendations for an average firm, which might not be ISS’s corporate client. The effect
7of competition is expected to be larger for ISS’s corporate clients. Absent competition, ISS
might be more likely to issue favorable recommendations for these companies due to the
conflict of interest discussed in Section 1.2. Were the corporate client data not proprietary,
I might be able to determine directly the magnitude of any conflict of interest – that is,
whether or not companies that subscribed to ISS’s consulting services were more likely to
receive favorable recommendations from ISS, compared with similar firms that did not.
This paper contributes to the policy debate on whether and how to regulate the proxy
advisory industry. My results suggest that conflicts of interest may be a real concern, and
increasing competition can help to alleviate them to a certain extent. With respect to
conflicts of interest, the SEC intends to issue an interpretive guidance that directs a proxy
advisor to disclose “any significant relationship” with issuers or shareholder proponents.
Another popular approach8 is to issue directives similar to those addressing conflicts by credit
ratings agencies, prohibiting certain conflicts of interest9 and requiring specific disclosures,
procedures, etc.
While this paper supports the view that greater competition is needed among proxy
advisors the readiness of investors to support multiple advisory firms remains doubtful. A
2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study recognizes this dilemma, noting that
some investors “questioned whether the existing number of firms is sufficient, while others
questioned whether the market could sustain the current number of firms.” Alternatively,
some industry experts have argued that not-for-profit proxy advisors are conflict-free and can
8The SEC stated in its July 2010 concept release on the U.S. proxy system that “in light of the similarity
between the proxy advisory relationship and the ‘subscriber-paid’ model for credit ratings, we could consider
whether additional regulations similar to those addressing conflicts of interest on the part of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (‘NRSROs’) would be useful responses to stated concerns about
conflicts of interest on the part of proxy advisory firms.”
9The following conflicts credit ratings agencies face are similar to what proxy advisors face: conflicts of
interest involved in both rating and helping to design the same securities; conflicts of interest in the provision
of ancillary services to issuers whose securities they rate. (see Center On Executive Compensation, 2011).
Other conflicts may arise when issuers shop for ratings (see Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2012).
8better serve the public interest. The entry of organizations like the Sustainable Investments
Institute (Si2) which assists retail investors in voting seems to support such a “public utility”
model. But eventual effects remain to be seen.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to a large literature on information intermediaries in both microe-
conomics and finance (see e.g., Biglaiser 1993; Lizzeri, 1999). A parallel topic within this
literature is credit ratings agencies. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) analyze credit rat-
ings agencies’ conflicts of interest, and find that increased competition leads to more ratings
inflation, as issuers are able to more easily shop for ratings. Similar papers that study ratings
inflation and shopping include Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009), Skreta and Veldkamp
(2008), Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009) and Camanho, Deb, and Liu (2012). Becker
and Milbourn (2011) provide empirical support, finding that competition in corporate bond
markets led to higher and less informative ratings. Griffin and Tang (2011) and Strobl and
Xia (2012) provide further evidence of ratings inflation.
This work also relates to the literature on conflicts of interest in financial markets. Davis
and Kim (2007) study mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms, and find a
positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Hong
and Kacperczyk (2010) find that competition among stock analysts reduces their optimism
bias in their research. Similarly, a number of papers find that analysts from brokerage houses
with underwriting relationship to a company tends to provide more positive forecasts than
those from unaffiliated houses (e.g., Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998;
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999; Michaely and Womack, 1999).
Regarding the proxy advisory industry itself, a handful of papers have documented a
strong association between proxy advisors’ recommendations and shareholder votes. The
effect of ISS’s recommendations has been estimated at 14-21% for management proposals
9(Bethel and Gillan 2002), between 13% and 30% for director elections, depending on the
context and time period (Cai, Garner and Walkling, 2009; Choi, Fisch and Kahan, 2010;
Ertimur, Ferri and Maber, 2012), and 25% for compensation-related shareholder proposals
(Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011). Also, Alexander, Chen, Seppi, and Spatt (2010) find that
an ISS recommendation in favor of a dissident in proxy contests increases the likelihood of
the dissident’s victory by 14%.
To my knowledge, only a few papers have studied impacts of Glass Lewis’s recommen-
dations, in addition to ISS’s. Choi, Fisch and Kahan (2010) find that for director elections
in 2005 and 2006, a Glass Lewis “Withhold” recommendation has a greater impact on a
vote if ISS has issued a “For” recommendation than if ISS has issued a “Withhold” rec-
ommendation. This suggests the possibility that some institutional investors automatically
will vote in favor of the board’s nominees if both ISS and Glass Lewis issue “For” recom-
mendations, but not if one of them issues a “Withhold” recommendation. Ertimur, Ferri
and Oesch (2012) focus on say-on-pay votes in 2011, and find a negative recommendation
from ISS (Glass Lewis) is associated with 24.7% (12.9%) more votes against the say-on-pay
proposal. These papers, however, explore only a small portion of the data. My paper is the
first to use Glass Lewis’s comprehensive voting recommendations for the period 2004-2011.
Together with ISS’s voting recommendations, this panel dataset enables me to study effects
of competition on incumbent advisor ISS’s recommendations during that period.
Another strand of literature questions the value of proxy advisors’ recommendations.
Daines, Gow and Larcker (2010) find governance ratings do not predict governance-related
outcomes, and there is little relation between ISS’s governance ratings and its voting rec-
ommendations. Larker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2012) find that companies following proxy
advisors’ guidelines on stock option repricing had worse subsequent performance.
This work also relates to the broad shareholder voting literature that identifies various
economic determinants of proxy voting outcomes (see e.g., Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988;
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Pound, 1988; Gordon and Pound, 1993; Morgan and Poulsen, 2001; Bethel and Gillan, 2002;
Cremers and Romano, 2007; Cai, Garner and Walkling, 2009; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Maug
and Rydqvist, 2009; and Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2010).
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I develop a model and derive testable
implications. Section 1.3 provides more background information on the proxy advisory in-
dustry. Section 1.4 describes various data sources and presents summary statistics. In
Section 1.5, I discuss the influence of voting recommendations. Section 1.6 discusses effects
of competition, and Sections 1.7 and 1.8 evaluate effects of increased competition on the
incumbent advisor’s voting recommendations. Sections 1.9 and 1.10 offer further discussions
and conclusion. References are listed in Section 1.11.
1.2 The Model
Consider a company owned by N > 1 institutional investors and run by management. Each
investor holds one share, and casts exactly one vote during shareholder meetings (a “one-
share-one-vote” rule). The management comes up with an exogenous proposal for a project
that requires shareholder approval. The game lasts for one period.
Value of the proposal to investors is uncertain. Let ω ∈ {a, o} denote state of the world,
in which a stands for “approve”, and o stands for “oppose”. If an “a” proposal is approved,
nothing goes wrong. However, if an “o” proposal is approved, with probability p it leads to
a loss and that is discovered by investors.
Investors share the same ex ante belief that the proposal is of type “a” with probability
1
2 . This is without loss of generality since an ex ante belief different from
1
2 will not change
our results. This creates a business opportunity for a proxy advisory firm (hereafter “PA”),
which can use its technology to discover the state. The PA costlessly extracts a private signal
s ∈ {a, o}, whose precision is e ∈ (12 , 1) and e is common knowledge:
11
Pr(s = a|ω = a) = Pr(s = o|ω = o) = e
Given the level of precision e, the PA proposes to sell its voting report to investors10
for a fee f . This report will contain a recommendation of m = A (“approve”) or m = O
(“oppose”). If at least one investor subscribes to its service, the PA will retrieve a signal
and make a report. Only investors who buy the report observe PA’s recommendation.11
At the same time, the PA provides consulting services to the company that investors own.
The company will buy PA’s services for φ if it makes a favorable recommendation m = A,
otherwise the company refuses to purchase the product.12 This creates potential conflicts of
interest for the PA. We say the PA is conflicted when it receives a signal s = o and reports
m = A.
Institutional investors will be held liable if their clients find out that they made a wrong
vote – that is, they voted for an “o” proposal. These investors are required by law (rules
the SEC adopted in 2003) to vote proxies in the best interests of clients. The clients may
sue13 these institutional investors for breach of fiduciary duty14 when they discover that their
10This buyer-pay business model is in stark contrast to the issuer-pay model adopted by credit ratings
agencies. Competition among credit ratings agencies can lead to ratings inflation due to issuer shopping.
Competition in the proxy advisory industry, however, may play a disciplinary role in the absence of shopping.
11For contested meetings in which a group of dissident shareholders seek shareholder support for their
own slate of director nominees, investors may observe voting recommendations given by advisory firms even
without purchasing their reports. The media tend to report high-profile proxy contests. On average there
were only 52 contested meetings annually for the period 1994-2008, as documented by Fos (2011). This paper
studies uncontested management proposals. For these proposals, the associated voting recommendations are
usually not widely reported by the media.
12In practice, a company may buy the PA’s consulting services in anticipation of its favorable recommen-
dation. Modeling this will yield similar results. φ is normalized by investor size N as per capita profit.
13Alternatively, clients may withdraw funds from these institutions. Since management fees are based on
assets under management, client withdrawal of funds is costly for such institutional investors.
14Institutional investors owe clients fiduciary duties under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940. Recent high-profile shareholder lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty involve Janus Capital Group
Inc. and the AXA Group Mutual Funds.
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shares were voted for an “o” proposal. Investors will incur a litigation cost (both monetary
and reputation costs) in case of such a lawsuit. On the other hand, voting against an “a”
proposal does not involve any litigation cost because the proposal never leads to a loss, and
the state therefore is not revealed.
There are two types of investors – litigation-averse and rational. A fraction α of in-
vestors are litigation-averse who wish to reduce litigation costs by relying on PA’s advice.
Since the PA is regarded as an expert in the corporate governance market, following its rec-
ommendation may convince clients that they acted in good faith. These investors often lack
appropriate incentives or necessary expertise to do research in order to make informed votes.
Without hiring the PA, expected litigation cost is C when a litigation-averse investor is held
liable for voting for an “o” proposal. However, if the investor obtains the PA and follows
its voting recommendation, then litigation cost is a smaller c (c is normalized to 0) when
the PA is found out to be conflicted. In reality, many institutional investors with limited
resources, such as small mutual funds, tend to be litigation-averse. The rest of investors
are rational in that they understand PA’s incentives and potential conflicts, and form their
belief of PA’s truthfulness.15 However, they do not observe the state or signal of the PA.
Rational investors will incur a cost C˜ if their clients discover that they voted for an “o”
proposal. Rational investors can be thought of as well-incentivized asset management firms.
Both types of investors will vote according to their ex ante belief – that is, each votes for
the proposal with probability 12 , if they choose not to buy PA’s report.
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If investors find out that the PA is conflicted, they will refuse to buy its reports in future
periods. Investors, however, are able only to discover ex post whether the PA is conflicted
15Allowing the PA to disclose potential conflicts of interest will not qualitatively change the equilibria as
the results are mainly driven by ligitation-averse investors, who will not use the disclosed information.
16We can allow rational investors to retrieve their own signal of the state, but this will not qualitatively
change any result.
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in the event of a loss. For example, after several months, investors involving in an M&A
deal that the PA supported may see it fall apart. As a result, they investigate whether the
PA received an “o” signal. If this is indeed the case, investors conclude that the PA did not
relay its signal truthfully, and will not purchase any further reports. In practice it is difficult
to determine if the PA is conflicted even ex post, but it is in general easier than ex ante.
Formally, the PA will incur a reputation cost ρ in terms of the present value of future profits
when it receives a signal s = o and reports m = A, and a loss occurs. Reputation cost ρ is
exogenous, as in Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) and Morgan and Stocken (2003).
As in Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012), I assume that there is a small amount of
uncertainty on the reputation ρ:
Assumption 1 The PA is uncertain about the value of ρ: ρ ∈ [ρ˜− , ρ˜+ ] such that → 0.
After the PA receives its signal, the uncertainty is resolved.
This tiny uncertainty prevents the PA from using mixed strategies for its report. Since
most institutional investors have to diversify in their investments, the company is likely to
be owned by many investors. N thus is assumed to be a large number. And without loss
of generality, I assume that N is an even number throughout the analysis. The analysis in
which N is odd is similar and is briefly described in the Internet Appendix. Voting rule is
simple majority.
1.2.1 The Monopoly PA
I first analyze the monopoly game. The timing of the moves is as follows:
1. The PA posts fee f for its proxy report of a company.
2. Institutional investors of the company decide whether to buy the report.
3. The company issues a management proposal for shareholder vote.
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4. The PA retrieves a private signal s ∈ {a, o} and makes a report of m ∈ {A,O}.
5. The company uses PA’s consulting services for fee φ if recommendation is “A”; other-
wise the company does not use PA’s services.
6. Outcome of the proposal realizes if approved. With probability p a loss occurs and
that is found out by investors only if the state is “o”. The PA incurs a reputation cost
from investors who buy its report.
Litigation-averse investors would like to buy the report if the value of information exceeds
price f . The profit-maximizing PA will set fee f low enough to woo litigation-averse investors.
Thus there are two reporting regimes for the PA – it always reports m = A when consulting
fee φ is greater than its expected reputation cost, and it truthfully relays the signal when
consulting fee is less than its reputation cost. An equilibrium also depends on whether the
fraction of litigation-averse investors α is greater than 12 and rational investors’ prior belief
of the PA’s truthfulness.
To simplify notations for the equilibria, I introduce these following definitions:17 β is the
probability that the proposal is approved when all litigation-averse investors vote for it and
each rational investor votes for it with probability 12 . γ is the probability that the proposal is
approved when all litigation-averse investors vote against it and each rational investor votes
for it with probability 12 . Since N is large, if one investor deviates (e.g., joins the other group
in voting), the approval probabilities are still approximately β and γ, respectively.18
I proceed to derive the following symmetric equilibrium under each informational regime:
17β = 1 − F (( 12 − α)N ; (1− α)N, 12) and γ = 1 − F ( 12N ; (1− α)N, 12). And F (·) follows a binomial
distribution.
18If one litigation-averse investor votes the same way as the rational investors, the actual approval proba-
bilities are βˆ = 1−F (( 12 − α)N + 1; (1− α)N, 12) ; γˆ = 1−F ( 12N + 1; (1− α)N, 12), respectively. Similarly,
if one rational investor votes the same way as the litigation-averse investors, the actual approval probabilities
become βˇ = 1− F (( 12 − α)N − 1; (1− α)N, 12) ; γˇ = 1− F ( 12N − 1; (1− α)N, 12), respectively.
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Proposition 1 When α < 12 , the Nash equilibrium of this game is:
1. If φ > βepρα, the PA always reports m = A, and sets fee f = 12
1
2βpC. Only litigation-
averse investors buy the report. PA’s profit is φ+ fα− 12βepρα.
2. If φ < epρ, the PA reports truthfully, and sets fee f = min[12
1
2(1− e)pC, 12 12(1− e)pC˜].
Both litigation-averse and rational investors buy the report. PA’s profit is 12φ+ f .
The proof is in the Appendix.
This proposition demonstrates that the PA can maximize the present value of its profits
by choosing either of the two informational regimes depending on rational investors’ belief
and parameter values. If rational investors believe the PA is conflicted, it maximizes its profit
by always reporting m = A when consulting fee φ is greater than expected reputation cost
βepρα. The PA sets price f at a level that equals the benefit of additional information for
litigation-averse investors. This reputation loss is from litigation-averse investors only since
they are the ones who buy PA’s report. Since the PA recommends m = A, with probability
β an “o” proposal passes and with probability ep it leads to a loss that is discovered by
investors. Conditional on these events, the reputation cost is ρα. For a low reputation cost
ρ and a small number of litigation-averse investors (a small α), the PA takes advantage of
litigation-averse investors by always reporting m = A. Voting behavior of rational investors
also plays a role here because collectively they determine the probability of approval β.
Note that for reasonable parameter values, there is no equilibrium in which (1) the PA
reports truthfully (when φ < βepρα), and (2) only litigation-averse investors buy the report.
Because the PA will lower fee f to a level at which it is beneficial for both types of investors
to purchase its report.
There is another equilibrium in which both types of investors buy PA’s report. If rational
investors believe the PA is truthful, it will report truthfully when its consulting profit is less
than expected reputation cost. The PA sets a fee that is lower than the cost of voting based
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on ex ante beliefs for either type of investors. Note this equilibrium does not depend on the
value of α.
When α > 12 , on the other hand, the PA completely determines vote outcomes.
Proposition 2 When α > 12 , the Nash equilibrium of the game is:
1. If φ > epρα, the PA always reports m = A, and sets fee f = 12
1
2pC. Only litigation-
averse investors buy the report. PA’s profit is φ+ fα− 12epρα.
2. If φ < epρ, the PA reports truthfully, and sets fee f = min[12
1
2(1− e)pC, 12 12(1− e)pC˜].
Both litigation-averse and rational investors buy the report. PA’s profit is 12φ+ f .
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. In the case that rational investors believe
the PA is conflicted, it always reports m = A when consulting fee φ is greater than expected
reputation cost epρα. Note that this reputation cost is greater than the corresponding
one when α < 12 . It is because now litigation-averse investors are the majority, and with
probability 1 an “o” proposal passes and it leads to a loss with some probability.
1.2.2 Competition among PAs
I now analyze a game where two PAs compete in selling reports to investors. Incumbent
player PA 1 sells reports to investors as well as consulting services to corporations, while new
entrant PA 2 sells reports only to investors. As in Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012), we
can think of these PAs as providing differentiated reports given that they receive imperfect
signals of the proposal’s type. For simplicity, I assume that both PAs retrieve independent
signals of the same precision e > 12 .
19 An investor may want to purchase both reports to
obtain more information. The timing of the moves is similar to the monopoly game:
19In a richer model, one can also differentiate the qualities of PAs’ signals. For example, we may assume
that PA 1 retrieves a signal of higher precision (e1 > e2). This reflects the fact that PA 1 is more experienced
than new entrant PA 2, and it thus receives a more “precise” signal.
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1. Two PAs post fees fi for their proxy reports of a company, where i ∈ {1, 2}.
2. Institutional investors of the company decide whether to buy one, both or neither
report.
3. The company issues a management proposal for shareholder vote.
4. The PAs retrieve their signals si ∈ {a, o} and make reports of mi ∈ {A,O}, where
i ∈ {1, 2}.
5. The company uses PA 1’s consulting services for fee φ if recommendation is “A”;
otherwise the company does not use PA 1’s services.
6. Outcome of the proposal realizes if approved. With probability p a loss occurs and that
is found out by investors only if the state is “o”. The PAs incur respective reputation
costs ρ1 and ρ2 from investors who buy their reports.
Since PA 2 does not provide consulting services, in equilibrium it always truthfully re-
lays its signal because recommending m = A when retrieving an “o” signal does not yield
additional profits. However, PA 1 may be conflicted when its consulting fee is greater than
expected reputation cost. Understanding both PAs’ incentives, rational investors will choose
to purchase a report from PA 2 when it charges a fee that makes these investors indifferent
toward buying its report or not.20 PA 2 attempts to charge a price that makes it beneficial
for both litigation-averse and rational investors to purchase its report. However, anticipat-
ing this, PA 1 will lower its price to a point that makes litigation-averse investors indifferent
towards purchasing a report from either PA. PA 2, on the other hand, can lower its price
only to a level that makes it no worse off by serving both types of investors than only serving
20In a “truthful” equilibrium in which both PAs relay their signals truthfully, rational investors will be
indifferent about purchasing reports from either PA if the PAs charge the same price. For simplicity, I
assume that rational investors will only purchase a report from PA 2 in this case.
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rational investors. Litigation-averse investors thus will purchase a report from PA 1. Un-
derstanding PA 1’s strategy, PA 2 raises its fee and sells reports to rational investors only.
This price competition leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1 There exists no equilibrium in which both types of investors purchase reports from
PA 2 only.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Price competition from PA 1 leads to market segmentation: litigation-averse investors
purchase a report from PA 1, while rational investors buy a report from PA 2. In such an
equilibrium featuring segmentation, competition plays two roles. First, although litigation-
averse investors stick to incumbent player PA 1, they now have an outside option (buying
PA 2’s report instead) created by competition. The existence of competitor PA 2, can serve
as a disciplinary device for PA 1, at least ex post (see Hörner, 2002). In case a loss occurs,
litigation-averse investors may be able to observe PA 2’s report, and thus make a more
informed guess about PA 1’s truthfulness. When the PAs disagree on their recommendations,
litigation-averse investors may examine PA 1’s report more carefully. Choi, Fisch and Kahan
(2010) suggest that some investors automatically vote for the board’s nominees if both PAs
issue “For” recommendations, but not if one of them issues a “Withhold” recommendation.
In practice, companies regularly learn proxy advisors’ voting recommendations after votes
are cast, and could pass on the information to investors if requested. It is reasonable to
assume that with this extra information on hand, litigation-averse investors will be more
likely to discover whether PA 1 is conflicted compared with the monopoly case. Define p˜ as
the probability that a loss occurs and that is discovered by investors when the PAs disagree
on their recommendations. So we have p˜ > p, where p is the corresponding probability under
monopoly.
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For simplicity, I further assume that investors can not decide whether PA 1 is conflicted
in case a loss occurs after the PAs issue the same recommendation. This is a somewhat
extreme assumption and is not essential, but it helps to simplify the analysis. However, it
is likely that when investors receive an identical recommendation from both PAs, they are
less likely to perform due diligence themselves. The empirical section of this paper shows
evidence that when two prominent PAs give the same recommendation for a proposal, the
probability of approval is much higher than an average proposal. This suggests that more
investors are likely to follow voting recommendations automatically when both PAs issue
the same recommendation. It is worth noting that there are potentially other ways to model
the effect of competition.21
Second, competition affects rational investors’ voting behavior. In the monopoly game,
these investors vote based on ex ante belief, and now they will follow PA 2 to make informed
votes. This matters for vote outcomes when rational investors are the majority (α < 12). As
in the monopoly case, I derive symmetric equilibria under each informational regime:
Proposition 3 When α < 12 , the equilibrium of the subgame is:
1. PA 1 always reports m1 = A and sets fee f1 = min[12
1
2(1 − e)pC, 12 12(1 − e)pC˜]. PA 2
reports truthfully and sets fee f2 = 12
1
2(1− e)pC˜. Litigation-averse investors purchase
PA 1’s report, and rational investors buy PA 2’s report.
The proof is in the Appendix.
In this equilibrium, rational investors are the majority and they determine vote outcomes.
PA 1 understands that these investors will vote according to PA 2’s recommendation. When
PA 1 receives an “o” signal, it always reports m1 = A due to the following reason: if PA 2
retrieves an “a” signal, it reports m2 = A. Since the PAs give an identical recommendation,
21In a richer dynamic model in which reputation ρ is endogenously determined, one can model competition
as an option of switching to PA 2’s services (see Hörner, 2002).
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it is difficult ex post for litigation-averse investors to determine which PA is conflicted. Thus
PA 1 will not incur a reputation cost. On the other hand, if PA 2 receives an “o” signal, the
proposal is defeated. As a result, PA 1 will not be liable either.
It is worth noting that this case is a “limiting” result. To the extent that PA 1 believes
that there is a certain probability that rational investors do not follow PA 2’s recommendation
(after purchasing its report), the expected reputation cost will be greater than zero. This is
because now there is a positive probability that an “o” proposal will be approved. In turn,
there is a positive probability that PA 1 will truthfully relay its signal. In other words, PA
1 can adopt a mixed strategy for its truthfulness.
I define q as the probability of being in the “o” state given PAs’ signals s1 = s2 = o. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 4, this is the probability that PA 1 incurs a reputation
cost when it is conflicted (it recommends m1 = A) in the case α > 12 . I now derive the
equilibrium of this game when litigation-averse investors are the majority.
Proposition 4 When α > 12 , the equilibrium of the subgame is:









reports truthfully and sets fee f2 = 12
1
2pC˜. Litigation-averse investors purchase PA 1’s
report, and rational investors buy PA 2’s report.




2(1− e)pC, 12 12(1−
e)pC˜] and PA 2 sets fee f2 = 12
1
2(1 − e)pC˜. Litigation-averse investors purchase PA
1’s report, and rational investors buy PA 2’s report.
The proof is in the Appendix.
This proposition establishes that PA 1 can maximize the present value of its profits by
choosing either of the two informational regimes. It maximizes its profit by always reporting
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m1 = A when consulting fee φ is greater than its expected reputation cost 12qp˜ρ1α.
22 This
reputation cost is from litigation-averse investors only since they are the ones who buy the
report. PA 1 sets fee f1 at a level that makes litigation-averse investors weakly prefer buying a
report from PA 1. Anticipating this, PA 2 raises the price and just sells the report to rational
investors. As in the monopoly game, for a low reputation cost ρ1 and a small number of
litigation-averse investors (a small α), PA 1 takes advantage of the litigation-averse investors
by always reporting m1 = A. PA 1, however, will remain truthful when consulting fee φ is
less than its expected reputation cost.
Each PA charges a different fee for its report between the two informational regimes. This
is because for each type of investors, costs of voting based on ex ante beliefs are different
between the two cases. In case 1, the proposal is always approved while in case 2, the
proposal passes only when PA 1 receives an “a” signal. Thus costs of voting based on ex
ante beliefs are higher for both types of investors in case 1.
Competition leads to more truthtelling if PA 1’s reputation cost 12qp˜ρ1α is greater than







can be shown that 2
q
< 4.23 Therefore, when p˜
p
> 4 · ρ
ρ1
, competition alleviates conflicts of
interest arising from PA 1’s consulting services. This, of course, is an empirical question.
More competition, however, will likely push up p˜, where p˜ equals to the probability that
investors discover that a loss has occurred.
In practice, it may be beneficial for litigation-averse investors to subscribe to PA 2’s
report, in addition to PA 1’s. Some asset management firms indeed subscribe to multiple
22When PA 1 retrieves signal s1 = o and reports m1 = A, and PA 2 retrieves signal s2 = o and reports
m2 = O, the proposal passes because litigation-averse investors are the majority. The associated reputation
cost for PA 1 is qp˜ρ1α. However, when PA 1 retrieves signal s1 = o and reports m1 = A, and PA 2 receives
signal s2 = a and reports m2 = A, PA 1 does not suffer a reputation cost because it is difficult for investors
to determine which PA is conflicted given the same recommendation. Thus the expected reputation cost is
1
2qp˜ρ1α.








< 4. Note that e > 12 .
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proxy advisory services. This enables these institutional investors to collect more information
before votes are cast. When the PAs give conflicting recommendations on the same issue,
investors may scrutinize the proposal. When the PAs issue an identical recommendation,
investors may feel more confident that they cast the right vote. In the Appendix, I show that
under certain assumptions there exist equilibria in which litigation-averse investors subscribe
to both PAs’ reports, while rational investors purchase a report from PA 2.
1.2.3 Predictions
The model allows me to address three issues regarding PAs’ strategic behavior and share-
holder votes. Propositions 1 and 2 show that when consulting profit φ is greater than
expected reputation cost, the incumbent PA is less likely to report truthfully. This leads to
the following predictions:
Prediction 1 The incumbent PA is more likely to issue favorable recommendations for com-
panies that subscribe to its consulting services, compared with the ones that do not.
Prediction 2 The incumbent PA is more likely to issue favorable recommendations for com-
panies that pay more consulting fees.
With competition, the likelihood that the incumbent PA is conflicted (receives an “o”
signal and reports m1 = A) depends on parameter α – the fraction of litigation-averse
investors. When α > 12 , the vote outcome is determined by litigation-averse investors. If
the incumbent PA is conflicted, there is a greater chance that it will be discovered because
investors now can access the new entrant’s recommendation ex post. This is because when
the PAs disagree on their recommendations, litigation-averse investors may examine the
incumbent PA’s report more carefully. The incumbent PA thus is more likely to report
truthfully under competition than monopoly. When α < 12 , however, the incumbent PA will
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not be caught if it is conflicted. The reason is that if the new entrant receives an “o” signal
(and it reports m2 = O), the proposal is defeated given that rational investors determine
vote outcomes. We therefore have the following prediction:
Prediction 3 When α > 12 , the incumbent PA is more likely to report truthfully under
competition than monopoly. The fraction of cases where the incumbent recommends “For”,
and the new entrant recommends “Against” are diminishing as competition intensifies. When
α < 12 , the incumbent PA is always conflicted.
Prediction 3 reveals that effects of competition on the incumbent PA’s truthfulness de-
pend on the value of α, the proportion of litigation-averse investors. It is a priori not clear
which group of investors are the majority. Whether competition plays a disciplinary role
thus is an empirical question. I test the effect of competition in Section 1.7.
Prediction 4 Under competition, when two PAs give conflicting recommendations, the pro-
posal is less likely to be approved. However, when the PAs issue an identical recommendation,
there is a stronger correlation between the recommendation and vote outcome.
Note that this prediction is embedded in the derivation of Propositions 3 and 4. Due
to market segmentation, litigation-averse (rational) investors tend to follow the incumbent
(new entrant) PA. When the PAs give the same recommendation for a proposal, investors
tend to vote the same way. When the PAs disagree on the proposal, the likelihood that it
will pass is smaller.
The remaining sections will take these predictions to the data. Due to data constraints,
Predictions 1 and 2 will not be tested directly.
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1.3 Background and Business Model
This section explains in detail important market and regulatory developments in the proxy
advisory industry. In 1988, the Department of Labor issued a letter mandating that pen-
sion funds have a fiduciary duty to vote their proxies in the best interest of their clients.
This prompted managers of employee retirement plans to seek advice from ISS, which was
established in 1985 and was the only proxy advisor at that time.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, ISS’s dominance in the industry continued to rise, thanks
to growing fiduciary obligations of institutional investors and increased shareholder activism
in the aftermath of the dot-com bust. Institutional investors hired proxy advisory firms to
help them assess corporate governance practices at public companies.
In 2003, the SEC reinforced fiduciary duties of investment advisors with respect to proxy
voting through widened application of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. These expanded
rules require mutual funds to publicly disclose their voting records, as well as adopt policies
and procedures to ensure that they vote proxies in the best interests of clients. These
requirements led to a rapid increase in demand for proxy advisory and governance services.
Since 2004, many large corporations (80% of S&P 500 companies) have adopted some
majority voting standard for director elections, thanks to a number of shareholder initiatives
and a series of amendments24 that facilitate the adoption of majority voting by company
boards. This has greatly increased leverages that investors and proxy advisors have over
directors. To curb bad compensation practices that potentially contributed to the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 951) requires companies to hold a non-
binding shareholder say-on-pay vote at least once every three years to “approve” executive
compensation. This new requirement applies to all shareholder meetings held after January
24Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) and the Delaware General Corporation Law were amended
to facilitate the adoption of majority voting by company boards or by shareholders.
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21, 2011. “The overall effect of say-on-pay will be to increase the influence of proxy advisory
firms as investors grapple with more than 16,000 additional proxy votes in 2011, many of
which require an understanding of each company’s pay philosophy and arrangements.”25
As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC in 2010 approved rules to eliminate broker
discretionary voting in uncontested elections as well as executive compensation matters,
including say-on-pay votes. This rule change is thought to be significant because brokers
tend to cast uninstructed broker votes in favor of management and can comprise up to 20
percent of total proxy votes. Combined with majority voting, it could result in more directors
failing to achieve majority support from shareholders. The elimination of broker non-votes
will likely enhance institutional investors’ power. This in turn increases the influence of
proxy advisory firms.
1.3.1 Major Proxy Advisors
Today, the proxy advisory industry is dominated by just two firms: ISS and Glass Lewis.
This duopoly structure has allowed them to have a significant influence on pay and corporate
governance policy. Since 1985, ISS has become a leading player in both proxy advisory
services and corporate governance ratings. It is currently owned by MSCI Inc.,26 a leading
provider of investment decision support tools to investors worldwide. As of 2007, ISS had
1,700 institutional clients, and a market share of 61%, based on clients’ equity assets. Its
clients included 24 of the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 25 asset managers, and 17
of the top 25 public pension funds. ISS’s core business includes proxy research and voting
recommendations. It also provides web-based voting services and consulting services to
25Center on Executive Compensation (2011).
26In early 2007, ISS was purchased by RiskMetrics Group Inc., a leading provider of risk assessment and
wealth management products. In 2010, RiskMetrics was acquired by MSCI Inc. in a transaction valued at
$1.57 billion.
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corporate issuers through ISS Corporate Services, Inc. (ICS), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
ISS. ICS provides products and services on executive compensation, corporate governance
ratings, voting analytics and governance research. ISS’s business model of selling data and
consulting services to corporations while advising investors how to vote on proposals of the
same issuers has led to charges that ISS is seriously conflicted. In 2011, approximately 21.2%
of ISS’s total revenue was generated from its ICS subsidiary.27 Despite vehement criticism
for potential conflicts of interest created by its consulting services, ISS has been reluctant
to spin off this business because of its high profitability.28 In fact, some industry experts
believe that without this highly profitable business, ISS’s operations would be, at best, only
marginally profitable.
Glass Lewis29 was founded in early 2003, and has quickly established itself as ISS’s main
competitor, controlling 37% of the market share in 2007. At the end of 2010, Glass Lewis
acquired Proxy Governance, Inc.’s 100 clients after the latter exited the market, further
increasing its market share. In 2011, it covered around 23,000 companies in more than 100
countries, inching closer to ISS’s coverage of 26,000 companies. A 2004 New York Times
article reported that “Glass Lewis has unseated [ISS] . . . from its position as the undisputed
leader in the field.” Like ISS, Glass Lewis provides proxy research and vote recommendations
to institutional shareholders. Glass Lewis’s ability to quickly cut into ISS’s market share owes
partly to the fact that it does not sell corporate governance services to corporations. Many
investors view Glass Lewis as less conflicted. A Glass Lewis executive stated in an email:
27See MSCI Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K) for fiscal year 2011.
28Much of the consulting revenue results from charging corporations for use of the ISS compensation
model.
29According to co-founder Gregory P. Taxin, the firm was named for two Supreme Court justices who
fought for individual rights and ethical corporate practices. “‘Glass’ is derived from the surname of William
O. Douglas, a former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman and a justice from 1939 to 1975, while
‘Lewis’ is a bow to Louis D. Brandeis, a justice from 1916 to 1939 who wrote Other People’s Money and
How the Bankers Use It.” (see Morgenson, 2004)
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“We do not advise or consult with corporations regarding their proxies; we believe to do so
would compromise our ability to objectively evaluate those proxies and advise our clients on
how to vote their shares.” Unlike ISS, Glass Lewis is not registered as an investment advisor
and hence is not directly regulated by the SEC.
After Proxy Governance’s exit at the end of 2010, there remain two other for-profit
proxy advisory firms, Egan-Jones Proxy Services and Marco Consulting Group. A new firm,
ProxyTell, LLC, appears to have entered the market in 2012. They collectively own less
than 2% of the market share, and thus is not a part of this research.
1.3.2 Concerns over Conflicts of Interest
The most common concern about proxy advisory firms, especially ISS, is potential conflicts
of interest inherent in their business model. As discussed above, ISS provides services to both
institutional investors and corporate issuers on the same governance issues, while Glass Lewis
serves only institutional investors. A 2007 GAO study summarizes ISS’s potential conflicts
of interest as follows: “For example, some industry professionals stated that ISS could help
a corporate client design an executive compensation proposal to be voted on by shareholders
and subsequently make a recommendation to investor clients to vote for this proposal. Some
industry professionals also contend that corporations could feel obligated to subscribe to
ISS’s consulting services in order to obtain favorable proxy vote recommendations on their
proposals and favorable corporate governance ratings.”
Responding to these public charges, ISS has installed a “Chinese Wall” between its proxy
advisory services and corporate consulting services, creating a separate subsidiary ICS to
serve corporate issuers. According to ISS, the “Chinese Wall” includes “legal, physical and
technological separations.” ISS also makes substantial disclosure to its institutional clients,
as well as adopts a “Code of Ethics” that applies to all employees regarding conflicts of
interest. However, these measures do not solve inherent conflicts of interest embedded in
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its business model. This paper studies whether ISS’s potential conflicts have become actual
conflicts, and whether increased competition from Glass Lewis has mitigated them.
Although this type of conflict is widely considered the most damaging, by no means it is
the only source of potential conflicts of interest. For example, the fact that proxy advisory
firms are owned by parent companies providing other financial services to clients has drawn
scrutiny. ISS is owned by MSCI Inc., a leading provider of investment decision support
tools to institutions, and Glass Lewis is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan Board (OTPP), a large activist pension fund in Canada. These
issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
1.3.3 Recent Regulatory Developments
It is surprising that proxy advisory firms are subject to little regulation despite their impact
upon investors and the importance of proxy voting to corporate governance and capital
markets. The principal governmental oversight for these firms is the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, but proxy advisors can easily escape such regulations. At the present time, the
only real oversight comes from institutional investors, who have little incentive to monitor
because proxy advisors provide cost-effective services which benefit their clients.
Concerns over conflicts of interest and other issues (such as barrier to competition, a
lack of transparency, potential inaccuracies and limited engagement with issuers) have led
to two GAO studies and a concept release on the U.S. proxy system issued by the SEC in
July 2010. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro noted that both companies and investors “have
raised concerns that proxy advisory firms may be subject to conflicts of interest or may
fail to conduct adequate research and base recommendations on erroneous or incomplete
facts.” According to a June 2012 article in the CFO Journal, the SEC will be issuing an
interpretive guidance to advise investors about their fiduciary duties in assessing information
provided by proxy advisors and potential conflicts of interest. The SEC is unlikely to address
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a perceived lack of competition among proxy advisors or otherwise limit the use of proxy
advisors. Instead, this guidance will focus on existing rules on investor fiduciary duty and
conflicts of interest.
In June 2012, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) also issued a white paper
on possible regulation of proxy advisory firms. The CSA aims to address regulatory con-
cerns about the services provided by proxy advisory firms and their potential impact on the
capital markets. In March 2012, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
published a discussion paper that considers possible policy options on proxy advisory firms.
In the same month, the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) proposed practice
recommendations for proxy advisory firms. However, as of today, no rules have yet been
adopted by any country.
1.4 Data Description
This study draws data from a number of sources. My primary datasets are ISS’s Voting
Analytics database and Glass Lewis’s Proxy Paper database. Both datasets cover share-
holder meetings during the period 2004 – 2011. Voting Analytics provides the identity of
companies, description of ballot items, shareholder meeting dates, management and ISS rec-
ommendations, and the number of “For” and “Withhold/Against” votes, as well as other
information. It covers all Russell 3000 companies30 since 2005, and includes most of the
Russell 3000 companies before 2005. This dataset is becoming popular among corporate
governance experts, as well as academics. Most exsiting papers use only data before 2005
(see Cai, Garner and Walkling, 2009; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2010). My dataset on Voting
Analytics is comprehensive and the most up-to-date.
30These are the largest 3,000 publicly held U.S. companies based on total market capitalization, which
represents approximately 98% of the investable U.S. equity market.
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Glass Lewis’s Proxy Paper database contains similar information to Voting Analytics.31
My paper is unique in its reliance upon Glass Lewis in addition to Voting Analytics, and only
this allows for the analysis of effects of competition on incumbent advisor ISS’s recommen-
dations during the period 2004-2011. Prior research has only explored a small portion of the
data. Choi, Fisch and Kahan (2010) use Glass Lewis’s voting recommendations for director
elections at S&P 1500 companies in 2005 and 2006. Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch (2012) focus
on say-on-pay recommendations at S&P 1500 companies in 2011. My own work matches
these two databases using CUSIP, meeting date and ballot item number. I exclude proxy
contests32 which yields 26,304 shareholder meetings at 4,807 unique companies.
For the same period, I collect numbers of ISS and Glass Lewis’s institutional clients, total
client assets, as well as numbers of U.S. meetings covered, all of which are annual figures.
The main sources are LexisNexis33 and Glass Lewis’s website. Evolution of Glass Lewis’s
market share based on client assets is plotted in Figure 1.1.
I obtain additional data from following sources: stock information from Center in Re-
search for Security Prices (CRSP), company accounting data from Compustat, Top-5 exec-
utives’ compensation and stock holdings from ExecuComp, firm governance characteristics
from RiskMetrics, and institutional holdings from Thomson-Reuters (13F). Voting data are
matched with these datasets on CUSIP and fiscal year. This is my main dataset. Addition-
ally, I match director characteristics, also obtained from RiskMetrics, to the voting data,
using director last name, CUSIP and year.
31In addition to Russell 3000 companies, Glass Lewis’s Proxy Paper database covers smaller firms.
32This paper studies uncontested management proposals, both theoretically and empirically. In a proxy
contest, a group of dissident shareholders seek shareholder support for their own slate of director nominees,
rather than the board’s nominees. The purpose of launching proxy contests is to gain corporate control.
This mechanism is more complex than uncontested management proposals, and is beyond the scope of this
paper. Interested readers are referred to Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008, Klein and Zur, 2009, and
Fos (2011).
33LexisNexis maintains the world’s largest electronic database for legal, news and business information.
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1.4.1 Voting and Company Characteristics: 2004-2011
Every public company in the U.S. holds an annual general meeting to elect the Board of
Directors and to transact other businesses such as executive compensation plans, ratification
of auditors, merger and acquisition. Starting January 2011, companies are required to submit
say-on-pay proposals for shareholder approval. In my sample, 90% of companies use a
plurality voting system for directors under which shareholders can vote “For”, “Withhold” or
“Abstain.” ISS and Glass Lewis make “For” or “Withhold” recommendations. The remaining
10% of firms use a majority voting rule34 under which ISS and Glass Lewis recommend “For”
or “Against.” Under a plurality rule, a director will be elected in uncontested meetings even
if she receives less than 50% of the base. Under a majority rule, a director has to step down
if she fails to receive 50% of total votes. The base for director elections is usually defined
as “For+Against/Withhold.” Thus I measure director election outcomes as the number of
“For” votes divided by the sum of “For” and “Against/Withhold” votes. ISS and Glass Lewis
recommend “For” or “Against” for all other ballot items. The base for these items is usually
“For+Against+Abstain.”
In Panel A of Table 1.2, I calculate the percent of “For” recommendations for executive
compensation plans and say-on-pay proposals for each company-year pair. I also calculate
the average percent of “For” recommendations for directors within each company in a given
year. They are done for ISS and Glass Lewis separately for the period 2004-2011.35
I also control for previous-year firm performance using both market-based and accounting-
based returns. The market-based return is a firm’s stock return in the 12 months prior to
its annual meeting. I also use 1-year excess return, 3-year excess return or abnormal return
from Fama-French (1993) three factor models. The results are similar and are not reported
34Many large companies, 80% of S&P 500 companies, have adopted a majority voting rule.
35Since say-on-pay proposals started in January 2011, associated metrics are calculated for 2011 only.
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due to space.36 For the accounting-based return, I use industry-adjusted return on assets
(ROA).37 ROA is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets.
Since 2007, RiskMetrics no longer produces the governance index of Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2003). I use an alternative governance indicator which equals 1 if a company has
both a classified board and a poison pill (see Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Cai, Garner and
Walkling, 2009). A combination of a classified board and a poison pill makes corporate
control change more difficult, and is seen as a decrease in corporate governance quality. In
the sample, 29% of firms have both policies in place. I collect information on board size,
the percent of independent directors and institutional and management ownerships. The
median board in my sample has nine members and comprises 75% independent directors.
Institutional investors hold almost three-quarters of the shares. These figures are consistent
with findings in the extant literature (e.g., Cai, Garner and Walkling, 2009).
As in Walkling and Long (1984) and Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004), I use abnor-
mal executive compensation as a measure of corporate governance. I estimate abnormal
compensation as the residual from a linear compensation regression of all ExecuComp firms
during my sample period. I include log assets, prior-year stock return, and industry and
year dummies as independent variables.
Voting mechanism is important when we analyze the effect of voting recommendations
on the actual votes. For example, for firms having confidential voting in place, sharehold-
ers may be tougher with management proposals because firm policy prevents management
from knowing how shareholders vote their proxy cards. Shareholders will be less concerned
about retaliation from managers. Unequal voting provisions,38 on the other hand, usually
36Results using 1-year excess return, 3-year excess return or abnormal return are available upon request.
37Following standard literature (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008), I subtract the median
ROA for all Compustat firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry and year.
38These provisions limit voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of others. Under time-phased
voting, shareholders who have held the stock for a given period of time are given more votes per share than
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benefit the management because managers are often given more votes per share than recent
purchasers (time-phased voting). All the above statistics are shown in Panel B of Table 1.2.
1.5 Influence of Voting Recommendations
Before empirically analyzing potential conflicts of interest and how competition can reduce
these conflicts, I provide evidence on how proxy advisors influence vote outcomes. A major
concern regarding conflicts of interest is that if biased recommendations translate into actual
votes, shareholder value may be adversely affected.
In this section, I examine how ISS and Glass Lewis’s recommendations affect vote out-
comes, and tease out their relative magnitudes. A vote outcome is a function of voting
recommendations as well as firm performance and governance characteristics. I analyze
compensation plans, say-on-pay proposals and director elections separately. Columns (1)-
(2) of Table 1.3 show investors’ reactions to compensation recommendations. A positive ISS
(Glass Lewis) recommendation was associated with 23.8% (8.3%) more votes for a compen-
sation proposal. These estimates are in line with Cai, Garner and Walkling (2009) and Choi,
Fisch, and Kahan (2009).39 In the Internet Appendix, I also show that ISS’s influence had
declined from the previous period (2004-2007) to the recent period (2008-2011), while Glass
Lewis’s influence had been on the rise. Vote results are related to voting mechanisms as well.
Compensation plans at firms with unequal voting (dual class shares) received higher votes,
possibly from managers.
Mandatory say-on-pay proposals began in early 2011, so with the data I have, it is
recent purchases. Another variety is the substantial shareholder provision, which limits voting power of
shareholders who have exceeded a certain threshold of ownership. In my sample, only 1% of companies
adopted unequal voting rules.
39Cai, Garner and Walkling (2009) first estimate a regression model of ISS’s recommendations based on
firm performance and governance characteristics, and then use the residuals from this model as their ISS
variables.
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possible only to compare influences of ISS and Glass Lewis’s recommendations for that
year. Consistent with results for compensation plans and director elections, columns (3)-
(4) show that ISS’s (Glass Lewis’s) endorsement was associated with an increase of votes
by 23.8% (12.6%). These magnitudes are in line with findings in Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch
(2012). Interestingly, a “For” recommendation from Glass Lewis on top of ISS’s endorsement
only added 6% to the vote, which suggests that the marginal value of an additional “For”
recommendation would be small.
Columns (5)-(6) show investors’ reactions to director recommendations. A positive ISS
(Glass Lewis) recommendation was related with an increase of votes by 21.7% (5.8%). As
shown in the Internet Appendix, although influences of both ISS and Glass Lewis had in-
creased since the previous period (2004-2007), the increase for Glass Lewis was more dra-
matic.
The aim of this section is to show that proxy advisory firms play some important role
in proxy voting, though there is not necessarily a causal relationship between voting rec-
ommendations and vote outcomes. As Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2010) point out, “investors
may select a proxy advisor based on their ex-ante agreement with the bases upon which the
advisor formulates its recommendations.”
1.6 Effects of Competition
In the following two sections, I propose two ways to investigate impacts of competition on
decisions of incumbent advisor ISS. First, I show that there was a convergence of recommen-
dations at the firm level as Glass Lewis’s market share increased. In particular, following
Glass Lewis’s entry the fraction of differing recommendations (ISS recommended “For,” Glass
Lewis recommended “Against/Withhold”) went down significantly, while the fraction of dif-
fering recommendations (ISS recommended “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis recommended
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“For”) barely dropped. Second, I examine whether ISS adjusted its recommendations for a
company after Glass Lewis began to cover that firm for the first time. To the extent that
conflicts of interest mainly arise when ISS serves both corporate clients and investors, this
is a measure of the disciplinary effect of competition. Effects of competition on ISS’s rec-
ommendations should be mostly felt at companies that subscribed to its consulting services.
After all, ISS was more likely to be conflicted in issuing voting recommendations for these
companies because these firms contributed a significant portion of its profits. Given infor-
mation on ISS’s corporate client base, we can test whether ISS mostly responded to rival
coverage of its corporate clients rather than its non-client firms.
1.7 Competition and Convergence of Recommendations
1.7.1 Estimation Strategy: Fixed Effects
To quantitatively examine effects of competition on the convergence of recommendations for
the period 2004-2011, I first regress the firm-level spread between ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s
“For” recommendations on Glass Lewis’s market share and a large number of firm observable
characteristics:
ISS_AvgForijt−GL_AvgForijt = α+δ ·GL_MktShrt+X ′ijtβ+ψi+ηt+µj ·t+ijt (1.1)
In equation (1.1), the dependent variable is the difference between ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s
recommendations for firm i in industry j in year t. GL_MktShrt is Glass Lewis’s market
share in year t. Xijt is a vector of firm characteristics including size, performance metrics,
executive compensation measures, governance indicators and institutional and management
holdings. Year fixed-effects ηt control for economy-wide trends that affect recommendations,
and company fixed-effects ψi control for all time-invariant firm-level variables. I further
36
include industry-specific time trends µj · t to account for differential linear trends in rec-
ommendations across industries. The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures how the
spread between these two advisors’ recommendations changes as Glass Lewis’s market share
increases. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
To separately identify the direction of changes in ISS’s recommendations, I first replace
the dependent variable in equation (1.1) by the fraction of differing recommendations at
the firm level (ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”). I then use the fraction of
differing recommendations in the other direction (ISS “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis
“For”). Our coefficient of interest is again δ, which now gauges how the fraction of differing
recommendations evolves following Glass Lewis’s entry.
1.7.2 Competition Metric
The intensity of competition can be measured by Glass Lewis’s market share. Since Glass
Lewis entered the proxy advisory market, it has increased its market share substantially.
There are potentially multiple ways to calculate its market share, and my main measure is
Glass Lewis clients’ total assets divided by the sum of Glass Lewis and ISS’s client assets.40
Industry experts and academics have used this ratio to gauge competition in this industry
(see Belinfanti, 2010). This measure is also similar to Becker and Milbourn’s (2011) measure
for credit rating agencies. Figure 1.1 shows evolution of Glass Lewis’s client assets (in trillions
of dollars) as well as its market share. Due to the fact that ISS’s client assets have remained
relatively stable over the years (between 23 and 25.5 trillion dollars), Glass Lewis’s market
share has closely resembled its client assets. As a robustness check, I also use alternative
measures for market share based on the number of institutional shareholders, as well as
coverage of U.S. companies. The results are similar, as shown in Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3.
40For any given client asset, there is some likelihood of overlap among proxy advisors since some clients
use the services of several firms.
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1.7.3 Results
Before conducting regression analysis, it is useful to visualize whether there is an overall
decline of differing recommendations between ISS and Glass Lewis. Figure 1.2(A) shows that
the average percent of differing recommendations (ISS “For”, Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”)
at the firm level has trended down since 2004. I do not include year 2003 in this analysis be-
cause Glass Lewis did not provide recommendations for individual directors in 2003. On the
other hand, there is no clear pattern for the average percent of differing recommendations
in the opposite direction (ISS “Against/Withhold”, Glass Lewis “For”), as shown in Fig-
ure 1.2(B). This supports our theory that with increased competition, ISS has substantially
lowered its frequency of “For” recommendations.
To see if there indeed is a general decline of differing recommendations for the same
firms since 2004, I restrict my sample to firms that never exited the Russell 3000 family.
This creates a balanced panel of 2,264 companies. Running regressions for the unbalanced
panel (not reported), I find similar results. First, I regress the firm-level spread between
ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s “For” recommendations on Glass Lewis’s market share. As shown in
Table 1.4, the difference between ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s “For” recommendations dropped
by nearly 1.7 percentage points for a 10 percentage points increase in Glass Lewis’s market
share during 2004-2011. This suggests that with Glass Lewis’s entry, ISS became more likely
to switch from making “For” recommendations to “Against/Withhold” than from making
“Against/Withhold” recommendations to “For”.
As shown in Table 1.5, there is a significant correlation between Glass Lewis’s market
share and the fraction of differing recommendations (ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”)
at the firm level. For a 10 percentage points increase in competition, this fraction of differing
recommendations decreased by 6 percentage points. Note that better governance quality as
measured in slower growth in executive compensation or higher ratio of independent directors
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contributes to less dispersion in recommendations. This is intuitive in that better governance
quality, especially slower growth in compensation, reduces information asymmetry. It there-
fore will be more costly for a conflicted proxy advisor to issue biased recommendations,
leading to a higher probability of identical recommendations from both advisory firms.
However, the fraction of differing recommendations of the opposite direction (ISS rec-
ommended “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis recommended “For”) barely dropped following
Glass Lewis’s entry. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 1.6 shows that for a 10 percentage points
increase in competition, this fraction of differing recommendations decreased by only 1 per-
centage point. Overall, these results suggest that competition resulted in a less friendly
posture of ISS towards corporations generally.
One might be concerned that the convergence of recommendations was attributed to
changes in ISS’s or Glass Lewis’s proxy guidelines. I check published proxy guidelines by
ISS and Glass Lewis for the period 2004-2011, and find no evidence of substantial changes
regarding major types of management proposals. I also calculate ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s
overall ratios of “For” for management proposals at the firm level, and find no evidence of
any trend. The range is 83%-89% for ISS, and 70%-81% for Glass Lewis (see Figure 1.3).
Some scholars point out that Proxy Governance was also a credible player before it exited
the market in 2010. Proxy Governance client assets were around 1 trillion dollars for my
sample period. I re-run regression (1.1) taking into account Proxy Governance’s market
share, and obtain similar results as in Tables 1.4-1.6 (not reported). Reverse causality is less
of a concern because if investors expected that ISS was going to be more truthful (less likely
to inflate the quality of management proposals), they would tend to subscribe to ISS more
often. This will likely inflict a positive bias on my results. In other words, absent reverse
causality, the magnitudes may be even larger. However, omitted variables at the firm level
may bias the results. Next I resort to a plausibly exogenous shock – the event that Glass
Lewis began to cover a stock for the first time – to analyze effects of competition on ISS’s
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recommendations.
1.8 Impact of Glass Lewis’s coverage
1.8.1 Estimation Strategy: Exploring an Exogenous Shock
When a proxy advisor obtains a new institutional client, by contract it must cover all portfolio
firms of the client. One Glass Lewis executive has remarked: “When we get a new client,
we make reports for all the firms in their portfolio.” Prior to establishing the relationship,
however, the advisory firm does not know which companies are in its prospective client’s
portfolio.41 Thus the very fact that Glass Lewis began to cover a company for the first time
served as an exogenous shock to ISS’s recommendations. Glass Lewis’s coverage provided
investors an alternative source of information, and ISS might adjust its recommendations in
the subsequent year for that company. To evaluate this effect, I regress the change in ISS’s
average “For” recommendation for company i from year t − 1 to t on a dummy indicating
Glass Lewis’s new coverage in year t−1, and a large number of firm characteristics and fixed
effects:
∆ISS_AvgForijt = α + δ ·GL_Coverageijt−1 +X ′ijtβ + ηt + µj · t+ ijt (1.2)
In equation (1.2), time fixed-effects ηt control for economy-wide trends, and industry-
specific time trends µj · t account for differential linear trends that might affect ISS’s rec-
ommendations. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The coefficient of interest δ,
equivalent to a difference-in-differences estimator, measures impacts of increased competition
on ISS’s recommendations.
41Institutional investors managing assets over $100 million must report their holdings on Form 13F with the
SEC on a quarterly basis. An advisory firm could access this information through SEC’s website. However,
Form 13F is allowed to be filed within 45 days of the end of a calendar quarter.
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The effect of competition is expected to be larger if that company was ISS’s corporate
client, due to conflicts of interest shown in Section 1.2. To test this hypothesis, a list of ISS’s
corporate clients is needed. Were the corporate client data not proprietary, I can add to
equation (1.2) an interaction term GL_Coverageijt−1 ·Corp_Clientit, where Corp_Clientit
is a dummy that equals 1 if company i is ISS’s corporate client in year t. The coefficient on
such an interaction term captures the effect of competition on ISS’s recommendations for
these client firms.
1.8.2 Validity of Estimation Strategy
Glass Lewis’s coverage of a firm for the first time can serve as a credible exogenous shock
to ISS’s recommendation for that firm. However, one may worry that that company might
respond to Glass Lewis’s coverage, thus might have different characteristics from companies
Glass Lewis already covered. This would likely bias the results. To check this, I regress firm
level characteristics at t on the dummy GL_Coverageijt−1 and three basic firm controls -
size, return on assets and stock return. In Table 1.7, none of the coefficients are significant
at the 5% level except institutional holdings. This is intuitive because the probability that
Glass Lewis had already covered a company is lower if institutional holdings of that company
were lower. After all, it is institutional investors who hired proxy advisors in the first place.
I control institutional holdings in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 to eleminate such potential bias.
1.8.3 Results
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 1.8 present effects of Glass Lewis coverage using the entire sample.
After Glass Lewis covered a company for the first time, ISS’s average “For” recommendations
decreased by 1.3 to 1.9 percentage points in the following year. This translates into a decrease
in “For” recommendations by 1.9% to 2.3% given that ISS’s average recommendation for
management proposals was 84%. It is important to note that this is only an imperfect
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measure of the disciplinary effect of competition. Many Russell 3000 companies did not
subscribe to ISS’s consulting services. The effect of competition is expected to be larger for
the set of ISS’s corporate clients as conflict of interest would mainly arise from serving these
firms. We will be able to test this prediction with a list of ISS’s corporate clients.
Table 1.9 provides robustness checks by looking at whether Glass Lewis’s coverage affects
ISS’s recommendations, regardless of whether the firm was already covered or not. Columns
(1)-(4) show that ISS’s “For” recommendations were around 4 percentage points lower when
the firm was covered by Glass Lewis. This suggests that ISS did not only respond to Glass
Lewis’s initial coverage of a firm, it might still become tougher as Glass Lewis continued to
cover it.
1.9 Discussion
This paper studies conflicts of interest arising from serving both shareholders and corpo-
rate issuers, and how competition among proxy advisors can alleviate these conflicts. As
mentioned in Section 1.3, although this type of conflicts are widely considered the most
damaging, there exist other types of potential conflicts. These include: (1) potential con-
flicts related to making recommendations on proposals sponsored by institutional clients;
(2) potential conflicts when owners, directors or officers of proxy advisory firms serving on
public company boards that have proposals on which the proxy advisors are making voting
recommendations; (3) potential conflicts when the proxy advisors or their parent compa-
nies provide other services to clients. Both ISS and Glass Lewis have all of these conflicts.
Although these types of conflicts are considered much smaller than the inherent conflicts
arising from serving both investors and corporations, it will be interesting to analyze these
types of conflicts in future studies.
Notice that this paper does not discuss conflicts of interest for shareholder proposals,
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which comprise about 10.3% of my sample, excluding director elections. Shareholder pro-
posals can be divided into three categories: corporate governance, executive compensation
and social policy. Each of these categories is interesting in its own right (see e.g., Cuñat,
Gine and Guadalupe, 2012; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Randall and Cotter,
2007; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Agrawal 2008; Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010). How-
ever, these proposals are considered to be more complicated than management proposals. A
shareholder proposing the measure could be a client of ISS, Glass Lewis or both. Without
knowing which investors use either advisory firm’s services, it would be difficult to analyze
the potential conflicts.
1.10 Conclusion
With ever growing institutional shareholdings and recent regulatory reforms to enhance
shareholder rights, proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis in particular, have become
powerful in shaping corporate governance. Industry experts have long criticized potential
conflicts of interest and a lack of competition in the business model. This paper is the
first to document the fact that increased competition can alleviate ISS’s potential conflicts
arising from serving both investors and corporate issuers investors own. I show that ISS’s
and Glass Lewis’s recommendations for management proposals at the firm level converged
rapidly when Glass Lewis’s market share grew for the period 2004-2011. This convergence
was largely attributed to the fact that with Glass Lewis’s entry, ISS became more likely
to switch from making “For” recommendations to “Against/Withhold” than from making
“Against/Withhold” recommendations to “For”. Furthermore, ISS endorsed a company’s
proposals less frequently when Glass Lewis began to cover it for the first time. As expected,
data suggest that actual vote outcomes were strongly correlated with recommendations from
both proxy advisors, and Glass Lewis became more influential as it achieved higher market
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share.
Evidence supports the model prediction that conflicts of interest inevitably arise when
a proxy advisor provides services to both shareholders and corporate issuers. Although
increased competition can largely reduce the magnitude of these conflicts, competition itself
may not be enough to completely eliminate them. The SEC is currently planning to issue an
interpretative guidance to require proxy advisors to disclose “any significant relationship”
with issuers or a shareholder proponent. This is an encouraging development. However,
ultimately the SEC should ban proxy advisory firms from providing advisory services to
institutional investors, while at the same time providing consulting services to corporate
issuers on the matters of proxy votes. Also, proxy advisory firms should be required to fully
disclose other conflicts.
It should be noted that while this paper supports the view that greater competition is
desirable in the proxy advisory industry, the readiness of investors to support more than
a few advisory firms remains unclear. An alternative solution is to promote a non-profit
model for proxy advisors to eliminate conflicts of interest and to better serve the public
interest. Other major issues in the industry include significant inaccuracies and a lack of
transparency in decision-making. One example is that corporate issuers cannot access Glass
Lewis’s reports before they are published, increasing the chance of inaccuracies. These issues
deserve careful study.
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of Glass Lewis’ Market Share
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Figure 1: Evolution of Glass Lewis’s market share 
 
The solid bars (left axis) plot Glass Lewis client assets for the period 2003-2011. The dashed line (right axis) plots Glass Lewis’s market share for the 
























2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Glass Lewis client assets 
($trillion) 
Glass Lewis's market share 
based on client assets 
Notes: The solid bars (left axis) plot Glass Lewis client assets for the period 2003–2011. The dashed line
(right axis) plots Glass Lewis’ market share for the same period. It is calculated as below
Glass Lewis’ market share = Glass Lewis client assetsISS client assets + Glass Lewis client assets
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Figure 1.2: Fraction of Differing Recommendations for Management Proposals Decreased
36 
 
Figure 2: Fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals decreased 
during 2004-2011 
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Figure 1.3: Average Firm-Level “For” Recommendations for Management Proposals from
ISS and Glass Lewis
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Figure 3: Average firm-level “For” recommendations for management proposals from 
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Table 1.1: Variable Definitions
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Assets  Total assets in billions of dollars 
Prior year 
industry-adjusted ROA 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total 
assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. I adjust ROA by the industry median 
(all Compustat firm/year at 4-digit SIC level) 
Prior year return The 12 months buy-and-hold return prior to shareholder meeting 
Book-to-market The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
Leverage (Book value of debt -cash)/Total assets 
Capex-to-assets Capital expenditures less the sale of PP&E divided by total assets 
Abnormal executive 
compensation ($million) 
Residual from a compensation regression where the dependent variable is the 
total CEO compensation and the independent variable include log assets, 
prior-year stock return, industry and year dummies, estimated with all 
ExecuComp firms for 2004-2011 
YOY change in executive 
compensation 
Percentage change in total executive compensation year-on-year 
Cash/total compensation The ratio of salary and cash bonus to total compensation 
Classified board A Classified Board (or “staggered” board) is one in which the directors are placed 
into different classes and serve overlapping terms 
Poison pill It provides shareholders with special rights in the case of a triggering event such 
as a hostile takeover bid. Typical poison pills give the holders of the target’s 
stock other than the bidder the right to purchase stock in the target or the bidder’s 
company at a steep discount, making the target unattractive or diluting the 
acquirer’s voting power 
Board size The number of board members 
Independent director A director that has no material connection to the company other than a board seat 
Compensation activism in 
past 3 years 
Equals to 1 if there was a shareholder proposal targeting compensation practice in 
the past three years 
Institutional holdings Percent of outstanding shares held by intuitional investors 
Management holdings Percent of outstanding shares held by top-5 company executives 
Confidential voting 
dummy 
Equals one if firm policy prevents management from knowing how shareholders 
vote their proxy cards 
Unequal voting dummy Equals 1 if the firm has two or more classes of shares with unequal voting power, 
and 0 otherwise 
Cumulative voting 
dummy 
Equals 1 if the firm has a voting system whereby shareholders can cumulate votes 
for a single director candidate 
Majority voting for 
directors dummy 
Equals 1 if the firm’s directors are elected only if they receive more than 50% of 
the votes 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for characteristics of management proposals, firm characteristics, 
and compensation and governance variables for Russell 3000 companies from 2004 to 2011. Details of the 
sample are discussed in Section 4. All variables are defined as in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Average “For” recommendations and votes per firm-year 
 




Executive compensation plan 0.80 0.74 0.83 
Say-on-pay proposal (2011 only) 0.88 0.79 0.91 
Director election (firm level average) 0.88 0.77 0.95 
All management proposals (firm level average) 0.85 0.70 0.93 
 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics, compensation and governance variables 
 
 N Mean Median SD 
Firm characteristics     
Assets ($billions) 22,100 11.23 1.28 79.26 
Prior year industry-adjusted ROA 19,243 0.03 0.02 0.28 
Prior year stock return 22,347 0.16 0.09 0.75 
Book-to-market 19,991 0.63 0.49 1.58 
Leverage 22,035 0.56 0.55 0.34 
Capex-to-assets 19,655 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Compensation measures     
Abnormal executive compensation ($millions) 12,347 -0.31 -1.06 4.06 
YOY change in executive compensation 12,663 0.40 0.10 5.59 
Cash/total compensation 13,040 0.42 0.37 0.22 
Governance measures     
Classified board & poison pill 11,265 0.29   
Board size 9,644 9.38 9.00 2.47 
Ratio of independent directors 9,644 0.74 0.75 0.14 
Institutional holdings 21,918 0.69 0.75 0.25 
Management holdings 13,079 0.02 0 0.08 
Voting mechanism     
Confidential voting dummy 11,265 0.13   
Cumulative voting dummy 11,265 0.08   
Unequal voting dummy 11,265 0.01   
Majority voting for directors dummy 24,954 0.10   
 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for characteristics of management proposals, firm character-
istics, and compensation and governance variables for Russell 3000 companies from 2004 to 2011. Details of
the sample are discussed in Section 1.4. All variables are defined as in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.3: Investors’ Reactions to Voting Recommendations
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Table 3: Investors’ reactions to voting recommendations during 2004-2011 
The dependent variable is the fraction of favorable votes for management proposals. ISS (Glass Lewis) “For” equals 1 if ISS (Glass Lewis) recommends 
for a management proposal. All other variables are defined as in Table I. Robus  standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, 
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of votes for 
 Executive compensation plan Say-on-pay proposal (2011) Director election  
(firm-level average) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ISS “For” 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Glass Lewis “For” 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
ISS “For” * Glass Lewis “For” 0.034* 0.034* -0.063** -0.062** -0.052* -0.052* 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.034) 
Firm characteristics  √  √  √ 
Compensation measures  √  √  √ 
Governance measures  √  √  √ 
Institutional and mgmt holdings  √  √  √ 
Firm FE √ √   √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √   √ √ 
Observations 3,856 3,856 963 963 7,359 7,359 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.77 
Notes: The dependent variable is the fraction of favorable votes for management proposals. ISS (Glass Lewis) “For” equals 1 if ISS (Glass
Lewis) recommends for a management proposal. All other variables are defined as in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm
level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Convergence of Recommendations
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Table 4: Convergence of recommendations during 2004-2011 
The dependent variable is fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations minus fraction of Glass Lewis’s “For” 
recommendations at the firm level. All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations less 
fraction of Glass Lewis’s “For” recommendations at firm level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Glass Lewis’s market share (client assets) -0.135*** -0.157*** -0.172*** -0.170*** 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.065) (0.066) 
Log assets -0.021** -0.029*** -0.033** -0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ind-adj ROA -0.022 -0.076* -0.082 -0.065 
 (0.018) (0.046) (0.066) (0.067) 
Prior-year stock return 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Leverage    0.072* 
    (0.042) 
Capex/Assets    0.213 
    (0.136) 
Abnormal executive compensation ($millions)  -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
∆Executive compensation YOY  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Cash/total compensation  0.025 0.017 0.017 
  (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) 
Classified board*poison pill   -0.017 -0.016 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Board size   -0.0005 -0.0007 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Ratio of independent directors   -0.029 -0.043 
   (0.043) (0.043) 
Institutional holdings    -0.012 
    (0.046) 
Management holdings    0.027 
    (0.062) 
Constant 0.269*** 0.369*** 0.446*** 0.386*** 
 (0.060) (0.088) (0.126) (0.132) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ 
Observations 17,732 10,859 8,067 7,929 




Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations minus fraction of Glass Lewis’
“For” recommendations at the firm level. All independent variables are defined as in Table 1.1. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Direction of Convergence in Recommendations
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Table 5: Direction of convergence in recommendations during 2004-2011  
The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the firm level 
(ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”). All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust 
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of differing recommendations 
at firm level (ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Glass Lewis’s market share (client assets) -0.632*** -0.600*** -0.553*** -0.559*** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.053) (0.054) 
Log assets -0.028*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Ind-adj ROA -0.020 -0.132*** -0.091 -0.042 
 (0.019) (0.050) (0.066) (0.066) 
Prior-year stock return -3.0e-4 -2.1e-05 -4.2e-4 -7.4e-4 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Leverage    0.107*** 
    (0.040) 
Capex/Assets    -0.043 
    (0.134) 
Abnormal executive compensation ($millions)  0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆Executive compensation YOY  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Cash/total compensation  -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
Classified board*poison pill   -0.018 -0.019 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Board size   0.001 0.001 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Ratio of independent directors   -0.084** -0.090** 
   (0.042) (0.041) 
Institutional holdings    -0.063 
    (0.052) 
Management holdings    0.041 
    (0.055) 
Constant 0.610*** 0.731*** 0.783*** 0.758*** 
 (0.055) (0.086) (0.110) (0.120) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ 
Observations 17,840 10,778 7,702 7,581 





Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the
firm level (ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”). All independent variables are defined as in Table
1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Direction of Convergence in Recommendations
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Table 6: Direction of convergence in recommendations during 2004-2011  
The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the firm level 
(ISS “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis “For”). All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust 
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of differing recommendations 
at firm level (ISS “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis “For”) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Glass Lewis’s market share (client assets) -0.110*** -0.131*** -0.123*** -0.124*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) 
Log assets -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Ind-adj ROA 0.005 0.012 0.036 0.051 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.034) (0.036) 
Prior-year stock return -0.003 -0.003 -0.008* -0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage    0.015 
    (0.021) 
Capex/Assets    -0.165** 
    (0.073) 
Abnormal executive compensation ($millions)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆Executive compensation YOY  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Cash/total compensation  -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Classified board*poison pill   -0.007 -0.007 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Board size   0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Ratio of independent directors   -0.031 -0.030 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Institutional holdings    0.003 
    (0.024) 
Management holdings    -0.004 
    (0.033) 
Constant 0.075** 0.050 0.104* 0.107* 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.058) (0.062) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ 
Observations 17,732 10,859 8,067 7,929 
R-squared 0.46 0.37 0.36 0.37 
 
 Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the
firm level (ISS “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis “For”). All independent variables are defined as in Table
1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Correlations Between Firm-Level Characteristics and Glass Lewis’ Coverage
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Table 7: Correlations between firm level characteristics and Glass Lewis’s coverage during 2004-2011 
All dependent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The values of dependent variables are taken at time t. 



















           
I{Glass Lewis began 
coverage at t-1} 
0.121 0.059 0.012 -0.002 0.082 0.006 -0.033*** 0.003 0.006 -0.002 
(0.108) (0.063) (0.008) (0.011) (0.069) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
Log assets 0.967*** -0.0001 -0.042*** 0.025 0.437*** -0.001 0.063*** -0.007*** -0.037*** -0.004*** 
 (0.165) (0.154) (0.008) (0.018) (0.085) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) 
Ind-adj ROA 2.056*** 1.073 -0.122*** -0.113* 0.0726 -0.001 0.014 -0.017* -0.182*** -0.002 
 (0.457) (0.678) (0.038) (0.063) (0.281) (0.024) (0.014) (0.009) (0.050) (0.005) 
Stock return 0.284*** 0.167** -0.021*** 3.2e-05 -0.104*** 0.002 0.005* -0.001 -0.004 0.002*** 
 (0.037) (0.071) (0.004) (0.006) (0.033) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant -4.923*** 0.083 0.678*** 0.206 5.730*** 0.704*** 0.159*** 0.073*** 0.883*** 0.068*** 
 (1.290) (1.266) (0.061) (0.138) (0.659) (0.049) (0.036) (0.018) (0.072) (0.017) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Observations 12,784 12,432 12,782 11,054 9,511 9,511 19,364 12,817 20,566 20,464 
R-squared 0.74 0.22 0.65 0.81 0.87 0.74 0.84 0.41 0.85 0.80 
Notes: All dependent variables are defined as in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The values of dependent variables are taken at time
t.
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Table 1.8: Impact of Glass Lewis’ Coverage on ISS’s Recommendations
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Table 8: Impact of Glass Lewis’s coverage on ISS’s recommendations during 2004-2011 
The dependent variable is the change in ISS’s “For” recommendations for management proposals at the firm 
level. All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) 
are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: Change in ISS’s “For” 
recommendations at the firm level from t-1 to t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
I{Glass Lewis started coverage at t-1} -0.023** -0.026** -0.018* -0.019* 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log assets  0.033 0.044 0.048 
  (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
Ind-adj ROA  0.057 0.049 0.047 
  (0.055) (0.212) (0.217) 
Prior-year stock return  0.013 0.010 0.012 
  (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) 
Leverage    -0.066 
    (0.086) 
Capex/Assets    -0.143 
    (0.410) 
Abnormal executive compensation ($millions)   -0.006 -0.008 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
∆Executive compensation YOY   -0.006*** -0.006*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash/total compensation   -0.057 -0.066 
   (0.063) (0.067) 
Classified board*poison pill   0.040* 0.038 
   (0.024) (0.025) 
Board size   -0.006 -0.007 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Ratio of independent directors   0.276** 0.289** 
   (0.116) (0.118) 
Institutional holdings    -0.078 
    (0.091) 
Management holdings    -0.032 
    (0.124) 
Constant 0.093 0.078 -0.045 0.063 
 (0.071) (0.151) (0.249) (0.257) 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ 
Observations 21,230 17,197 7,827 7,701 





Notes: The dependent variable is the change in ISS’s “For” recommendations for management proposals at
the firm level. All independent variables are defined as in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at
the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Persistent effects of Glass Lewis’s coverage on ISS’s recommendations 
The dependent variable is fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations for management proposals at the firm level. 
All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are 
reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of ISS’s “For” 
recommendations at the firm level at t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
I{Glass Lewis covered at t} -0.043** -0.045** -0.034* -0.041* 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Log assets  0.007 0.011 0.009 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ind-adj ROA  0.047 0.033 0.042 
  (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) 
Prior-year stock return  0.002 0.013** 0.014** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage    -0.016 
    (0.030) 
Capex/Assets    0.108 
    (0.093) 
Abnormal executive compensation ($millions)   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
∆Executive compensation YOY   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Cash/total compensation   -0.020 -0.022 
   (0.018) (0.018) 
Classified board*poison pill   0.015 0.016 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Board size   -0.002 -0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of independent directors   0.084*** 0.081*** 
   (0.028) (0.028) 
Institutional holdings    0.011 
    (0.030) 
Management holdings    0.028 
    (0.048) 
Constant 0.782*** 0.745*** 0.843*** 0.815*** 
 (0.098) (0.106) (0.094) (0.101) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ 
Observations 26,301 20,634 8,927 8,715 




Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations for management proposals at the
firm level. All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm
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Chapter 2
The Value of Access to Public Transportation
in a Congested City – Evidence from Housing
Prices in Beijing
2.1 Introduction
Modern urban economic theory predicts a trade-off between property values and commuting
costs. This can be illustrated by the classic monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964; Muth
1969; Mills, 1967) in which all employment is concentrated in the Central Business District
(CBD), and residents commute to the CBD through radial roads with no congestion. The
fact that residents are identical implies an equal utility at all locations since any resident
can replicate the location and consumption bundle of anyone else. To achieve the same
utility with an increase in the distance to the CBD, and thus with a greater commuting cost
(opportunity cost in lost wages), the rental price must fall to reach the same consumption
level.
This stylized model typically assumes constant travel speed. However, in fast-growing
megacities like Beijing, Mumbai and Shanghai, severe traffic congestion causes substantial
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delay time for commuters, lowering consumer welfare. As one of the most important types
of negative externality in cities, congestion costs are reflected in lower housing prices (Solow
and Vickrey, 1971; Fujita, 1989). Governments in large cities invest heavily in public trans-
portation in an effort to minimize traffic congestion.1 However, not all public transit modes
are created equal. Although an increase in bus routes would better connect residential ar-
eas and the workplace, buses themselves often cause traffic delays, potentially decreasing
consumer welfare. On the other hand, metro lines do not compete with vehicles for space,
and could be more effective in reducing traffic congestion. Therefore, aggregate quantity of
public transit services does not necessarily increase consumer welfare.
I begin the study of the impact of public transportation by analyzing a monocentric
model. Before introducing a metro line, the model features a rent “gradient” between the
CBD and urban fringe. Because of increased commuting costs, housing prices decrease
with the distance from the CBD. With traffic congestion, the model implies a negative
association between congestion and housing prices. The introduction of a metro line reduces
commuting costs along the line, resulting in an increase in residential rents in the proximity
of the line. The differential jump is more pronounced for areas that originally had more
severe congestion. Besides reducing negative effects of congestion, the metro line also causes
disposable income to increase and the urban fringe to expand.
These predictions are tested in the context of Beijing, a rapidly-growing megacity that
has had severe traffic congestion. I find that road congestion has a large negative impact on
housing prices in Beijing. A half-hour increase in daily delay time2 translates into a 3.8%
decrease in housing prices. The order of magnitude appears to be large, compared to that
1According to Beijing Municipal Commission of Transportation, governments in Beijing, the largest city
in China, spent 5.3% of its GDP on improving its transportation infrastructure annually between 1993 and
2003.
2Daily delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours – One-way travel hours at the speed limit)×2. I assume
workers drive to work.
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in Brounen, Neuteboom and Xu (2010). It is important to note that I make an assumption
that all workers drive to work, so that to the extent that many people in Beijing still take
buses to work, the variable – travel delay time – may be underestimated.3 The instrumen-
tal variable estimation yields consistent but somewhat larger magnitudes, suggesting that
reverse causality could be present in the baseline results.
There are multiple approaches that cities could use to combat traffic congestion. These
include developing public transit systems, expanding road capacity as well as charging peak-
hour tolls or restricting vehicle usage. Although the Beijing Municipal Government has used
all of the three ways to alleviate congestion, it has relied the most on developing an expansive
metro system that serves the entire city. The second part of the paper examines whether the
presence of public transportation has indeed mitigated the adverse effect of traffic congestion.
I find that the negative effect of congestion on housing prices is smaller when there are metro
stations within walking distance. I further show that construction announcements of new
metro lines have a strong effect on prices of properties in the proximity of the stations. The
difference-in-differences coefficient of 3.3% translates to a difference of 560 yuan per square
meter ($8.0 per square foot) within a six-month window. Furthermore, the effect is more
pronounced in more congested places, suggesting the metro system is expected to alleviate
the negative impact of traffic congestion. However, additional bus routes are not capitalized
into prices since buses move slowly in the gridlocked city, often exacerbating rather than
alleviating congestion.
The literature on anticipated effects of public infrastructure in developed countries gives
mixed results. Several papers find significant capitalization effects (see McMillen and Mc-
Donald, 2004; Damm et al., 1980; McDonald and Osuji, 1995), while Gatzlaff and Smith
3By assuming that every worker rides the bus to work, and that bus rides double the delay time I
calculate, the effect is still economically significant – half an hour delay per day translates into a 1.9%
decrease in housing prices.
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(1993) find no announcement effect of a new train system in Miami. The positive magnitudes
found in these studies are typically smaller than those in this paper. For example, McMillen
and McDonald (2004) show that within 1.5 years following the announcement of Chicago’s
Midway Line, houses closer to the line were 4.2% higher than those further away. My study
yields a 3.3% difference within 6 months following the announcement, a higher magnitude.4
This more significant result found in Beijing may be due to lower car ownership as well as
higher density (see Zheng and Kahn, 2008).
This is one of the first papers that use micro-level congestion data to assess property
values. This enables me to calculate delay time at the property level, utilizing a series of
city-wide speed maps for the period 2005-2011. Existing empirical studies in urban economics
involving commuting time usually gather survey data either at the city level (e.g., Coulson
and Engle, 1987; Gordon, Kumar and Richardson, 1991) or at the metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) level (e.g., Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000).
This paper also contributes to the policy debate regarding efficient mass transit systems in
fast-growing megacities. In these congested cities, workers seem to attach different premiums
to different public transit modes. My estimates confirm that housing prices are sensitive
to new metro lines but not to additional bus routes. The reason may be that in extremely
congested cities, additional bus routes exacerbate rather than alleviate congestion. Although
further cost-benefit analysis needs to be applied to both transit modes (e.g., Winston, 2007),
it is reasonable to argue that the metro system may be more desirable in megacities. Note
that this paper does not discuss direct measures that could curb traffic congestion, such as
congestion pricing and highway investment (see e.g., Vickrey, 1969 and Leape, 2006 for a
discussion). At of late 2012, the Beijing Municipal Government was discussing a possible
congestion charge in the urban area, and I plan to analyze it in a follow-up study.
4I also show that the difference amounts to 10.4% within 2.5 years after the announcement.
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2.1.1 Related Literature
Although there exists a large theoretical literature on traffic congestion and congestion pric-
ing (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 1993), the empirical literature in this
area remains less developed. A growing body of policy papers have attempted to evaluate the
welfare costs of congestion by measuring the direct monetary costs (e.g., Mun and Yonekawa,
2006; Hartgen and Fields, 2009). The Foton Motor Report (2010) find that economic costs
of congestion in Beijing are 4,027 yuan per capita in 2009 ($631), which is somewhat larger
than my findings.5 Note that these papers could only measure current cost of congestion,
while my paper does a reasonable job in calculating all future costs as reflected in differential
property prices.
Another strand of literature looks at the relationship between traffic congestion and land
use patterns (e.g., Solow and Vickrey, 1971; Fujita, 1989; Arnott and MacKinnon, 1978).
It is important to note that a decrease in traffic congestion does not necessarily lead to a
reduction in housing price, since traffic congestion is often temporary (most severe during
rush hours) and difficult to predict. A few papers have explored the relationship between
traffic congestion and housing prices, either at the city level or district level. Coulson and
Engle (1987) find that transport costs, especially time and gasoline costs, were capitalized
into housing prices across major U.S. cities. Using Dutch traffic data, Brounen, Neuteboom
and Xu (2010) find a negative relationship between traffic congestion and house prices at
the district level in the Netherlands. Zhang and Shing (2006) compare house prices inside
and outside London’s congestion-charge zone, and find that the gap in house prices reduced
after London imposed the charge. Although other factors may potentially affect the price
gap, their paper provides indirect evidence that traffic congestion and house prices may be
5Beijing’s population in 2009 was 17.55 million. This implies that the annual monetary cost of congestion
was around 70.7 billion yuan, which amounted to 4.4% of Beijing’s Gross Metropolitan Product in 2011.
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negatively correlated.
This paper also relates to the vast empirical literature that studies the effects of im-
proved accessibility, such as new transit systems, on house values (see Vessali, 1996 for a
comprehensive review). Smersh and Smith (2000) and Agostini and Palmucci (2008) study
price impacts of a new bridge in the U.S. and a metro line in the Chile, respectively. They
find that the completion of these infrastructure projects had a positive effect on local house
prices. At the macro level, various studies have shown a linkage between infrastructure and
GDP or population growth. Atack, Bateman, Haines and Margo (2010) examine the effect
of railroads on urbanization and population growth in the U.S. Banerjee, Duflo and Qian
(2009) estimate the effect of railroad networks on regional growth in China. Both of these
papers find a positive relationship between regional growth and the distance to major rail-
roads. My paper also relates to the literature that studies the effect of infrastructure on
trade costs and its consequences (see Michaels, 2008; Donaldson, 2010).
Other authors have evaluated the costs and benefits of infrastructure investments. Du-
ranton and Turner (2011) conclude that increased provision of roads or public transit is
unlikely to relieve congestion, which is consistent with Winston (2006) who finds that in-
vestment in highways is ineffective in alleviating congestion. Winston (2007) further shows
that investment in rapid transit lines in the U.S. is not socially efficient due to low ridership.
This paper does not discuss agglomeration economies, such as how traffic congestion affects
productivity in cities (e.g., Mun and Yonekawa, 2006; Weisbrod, Vary and Treyz, 2007;
Hartgen and Fields, 2009)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I presents a conceptual
framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 provides a history of Beijing’s
urban form, housing market, as well as its transportation system. Section 2.4 describes
the various data sources and presents summary statistics. In Section 2.5, I estimate the
impact of road congestion on housing prices. Section 2.6 estimates the announcement effect
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of new metro lines on housing prices. Section 2.7 offers further discussions, and Section 2.8
concludes. References are in Section 1.9.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
To inform the empirical estimation I provide a simple model of transportation infrastructure
and urban growth in which a city can grow by drawing population from rural areas. In
the spirit of Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969), I consider an open city version
of the monocentric model in which residents commute to a central business district (CBD)
to work. To ease exposition, I deliberately abstract from a number of important details:
agglomeration effects (endogenous wages), the production of housing and endogenous lot
size. These features can be incorporated into the basic monocentric city model described
here at some cost in complexity.
All residents receive a wage w by working at the CBD. All city residents occupy one
unit of land at endogenously determined rental price R(x) where x is the distance to the
CBD. Residents spend their income, net of rent and commuting, on a numéraire good c. To
form the baseline scenario, I assume that the city initially has no mass transit system, and
residents drive6 to the CBD along linear “rays” that assemble surface roads.7 The commuting
cost is b per unit of distance. b reflects the opportunity cost in lost wages, and is inversely
proportional to the travel speed.
Residents derive utility from consumption according to an increasing concave utility
function U(c). Because all individuals are identical, in equilibrium everybody has the same
6To keep the model tractable, I do not consider commuters who take the bus. See Baum-Snow (2005) for
more details.
7For simplicity I do not consider heterogeneous travel speeds on roads, such as those of surface streets,
expressways and highways. In Beijing, most expressways and highways are equally congested as surface
streets during peak hours.
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utility and cannot gain higher utility by moving to an alternate location. Let the reservation
utility be u. With free migration, we have
U(w − bx−R(x)) = u
Inverting U(·), we have w − bx − R(x) = k for k = U−1(u). Thus, the rent for any
occupied location in the city is
R(x) = w − bx− k (2.1)
It is straightforward to observe that land rent decreases in the distance to the CBD, due
to increased transportation cost. As in Duranton and Turner (2012), I assume that land
outside of the city is employed in agriculture and generates reservation land rent r. Thus,




(w − r − k) (2.2)
Since each resident consumes one unit of land, this condition also determines equilibrium
city population
N∗ = pi(x)2 = pi
b2
(w − r − k)2 (2.3)
2.2.1 Introducing A Transit Line
As in Baum-Snow (2007), I introduce one transit line that is modeled as a linear “ray”
emanating from the CBD. The speed ratio on surface streets to the transit line is γ < 1,8
so unit cost of taking the transit is bγ, which is smaller than that of driving. Given severe
congestion in cities like Beijing, especially during the peak hours, this seems to be a realistic
assumption. For simplicity, I normalize fixed pecuniary costs of driving and taking the
8Baum-Snow (2005) discusses the case in which γ > 1.
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transit to zero.9
Space is indexed in polar coordinates (x, φ), where φ is the angle to the transit line. It is
convenient to break the urban area up into two areas: one in which residents do not use the
transit line for any part of their commutes and another in which residents commute at least
partly via the transit. In the former region, commuting cost remains as bx. In the transit
commuting region, I restrict to the case where residents drive to the transit line via concentric
circles around the origin.10 Now the unit cost of commuting is b(γ + φ) from location (x, φ).
bφ is the commuting cost of reaching the transit line, and bγ is the commuting cost of riding
the transit. A resident living at location (x, φ) chooses the commuting route to achieve the
minimum traveling cost: min[bx, bx(γ + φ)].
Define φ as the angle separating the two regions specified above. It is straightforward to
show that φ = 1− γ. Residents living beyond φ still commute only on surface streets, while
those living at angles φ ≤ φ will use both modes of commuting (See Figure 2.1). The rental
price for the latter is
R(x) = w − bx(γ + φ)− k (2.4)
Comparing equation (2.3) with equation (2.1), rental price at angles φ ≤ φ is higher than
the baseline case after the introduction of the transit line. The reason again is lower cost
associated with transportation. Similar to equation (2.2), the boundary at φ ≤ φ is
x(φ) = 1
b(γ + φ)(w − r − k)
As shown in Figure 2.1, the urban area expands at angles φ ≤ φ, comparing with the
9See Baume-Snow(2005) for a detailed discussion.
10There are other reasonable assumptions on how residents access the transit line using surface streets,
such as perpendicularly via linear streets, in which unit cost is b(γ cosφ+ sinφ). See Anas and Moses (1979)
and Baum-Snow (2007) for detailed discussions.
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baseline case. This is caused by rising net income brought by the transit line, pushing
residents away from the CBD. Since each resident consumes one unit of land, the equilibrium







2.2.2 Incorporating Traffic Congestion
Thus far, I have assumed that the city is free of traffic congestion, so transport cost is a
linear function of commuting distance x. However, traffic congestion is probably one of
the most important type of negative externality in large cities like Beijing. Let N(x) be the
number of households residing beyond distance x, thusN(x) equals the number of commuters
passing through radius x. Now the marginal cost of travel has a fixed component b, as well
as endogenous congestion. Here I use an amended version of the Solow (1973) congestion
function where the cost per unit distance due to congestion is proportional to demand N(x)







As in Wheaton (2004), this model assumes that transportation capacity can be provided
without using up land, and so L(x) implicitly reflects only road “capital.” This simplifies the
model. Thus before the construction of the transit line, rent at location x is given as below












Traffic congestion increases commuting costs at each location x, reducing disposable
income located to housing. The transit line does not affect rent prices in the area at angles
73
φ > φ because residents will not take advantage of the transit. However, in the area at
angles φ ≤ φ, rent becomes
R(x) = w −
[










A few assumptions need to be discussed. First, I assume that there is no congestion
associated with the transit line. Although this is a somewhat extreme assumption, in practice
transit companies regularly dispatch more trains during peak hours, easing congestion along
the transit. The second term in the bracket represents traffic congestion along the concentric
circles.
2.2.3 Empirical Implications
The stylized model allows me to address how changes in transport accessibility affect housing
prices, as well as disposable income and urban population. Consider an urban location x
at angle φ ≤ φ. The transit project is announced at time t = 0, and is scheduled to be
completed at time t = T . The price of the house at x equals to the expectation of the
present value of all future rent streams, that is, P0(x) = E0 [
∑∞
0 β
tRt(x)]. Since rental price
after t = T will increase as shown in equation (2.4), house price at the announcement date
t = 0 will jump. Since prices already reflect future information, the completion of the transit
will have a smaller effect on prices. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 5 The announcement of a new transit line leads to a jump in prices of houses
along the line (at angles φ ≤ φ), compared with those in other parts of the city. The actual
completion of the line may have a smaller effect on prices.
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) show that congestion increases commuting costs and leads to
lower rents. Absent future government measures to curb congestion, house prices will be
74
lower as well. Although it is difficult to compare equations (2.6) and (2.7) directly, if we
assume that road capacity is uniform across the city, then we can show that congestion cost
is lower after the transit line is built. Coupled with lower commuting costs unrelated to
congestion, rents will be higher in the transit commuting region.
In more congested places, where L(·) is smaller, the difference in rents between equations
(2.6) and (2.7) is greater. This implies that house prices respond more strongly in places
that are more congested.
Prediction 6 Traffic congestion adversely affects housing prices in a city. The completion
of a transit line alleviates traffic congestion along the line, and pushes up house prices. Prices
are more responsive in more congested locations.
The remaining sections will take these predictions to the data. Before doing so, it is worth
noting one disconnect between the theory and the empirical study. In the model, the transit
commuting region is defined as the region φ ≤ φ, while in reality it is likely to be areas close
to individual stations. So to more closely match the empirical setting, I would need a model
with discrete transit stations. In this paper, I work with the model as described, and test the
predictions using distance measures outlines in the empirical section, while acknowledging
that the latter is a proxy for the transit commuting region.
2.3 Empirical Setting
In this section, I provide background information on Beijing’s urban form and housing mar-
ket, as well as its transportation system. It highlights the interlink between urban develop-
ment and transportation accessibility.
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2.3.1 Beijing’s Urban Form
Figure 2.2 shows Beijing’s metropolitan area, which consists of 18 districts. Tiananmen
Square and the surrounding commercial, cultural, and administrative areas are traditionally
regarded as the city center. The city center roughly spans four districts: Dongcheng, Xicheng,
Chongwen, and Xuanwu. Throughout this paper I define Tiananmen Square as the city
center. Since China adopted its Economic Reform in 1978, Beijing has expanded rapidly,
fueled by strong economic growth. By 2000, the urban area had included four more districts:
Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai and Shijingshan. This is the area roughly within the 5th Ring
Road. Since the early 2000s, the city has seen continued growth in the suburban area,
and even the rural area, encouraged by an improved transportation system and government
policy to quickly achieve urbanization.
Despite its rapid urban expansion, Beijing remains a monocentric city. Its city center
continues to attract a large share of the metropolitan area’s economic activities, mainly due to
the concentration of urban amenities, as well as government agencies which is a major sector
in Beijing. According to Zheng and Khan (2008), over 70% of Beijing’s total employment
and 65.2% of its population are concentrated within 10 kilometers of Tiananmen Square.
This monocentric structure is in stark contrast to many cities in the United States, where
employment has spread to the suburban areas (see Glaeser and Kahn, 2001).
Unlike those in many American cities, wealthier residents in Beijing live closer to the
city center (see Zheng, Fu and Liu, 2006). For example, residents in Dongcheng District,
near the city center, earned disposable income of 34,626 yuan ($5,361) in 2011, 23% more
than those living in Shunyi, a suburban district. There are potentially many reasons that
have contributed to this pattern. Among them are a concentration of high-paying jobs
and amenities near the city center, as well as extremely high opportunity costs related to
transportation.
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2.3.2 Beijing’s Housing Market
Ever since China unveiled its market-based housing reform in 2003, Beijing’s property market
has developed rapidly. Residential properties have dominated the market, accounting for
more than 70% of the total sold floor areas. Due to limited land supply by the municipal
government and increased housing demand from an influx of migrants, Beijing’s real estate
market has become a sellers’ market. The average selling price of new housing units has
risen rapidly since 2004, from 4,700 yuan to over 17,000 yuan in 2010, an increase of more
than three-fold (see Figure 2.3). Pressures on housing prices will continue to exist given
rapid economic development and population growth. The number of permanent residents
was 19.6 million in 2011, an increase of 44.5% from 2000.
Given limited land supply in the urban areas, recent new residential land supply has
concentrated in the suburban districts outside the 5th Ring Road, such as Fangshan, Shunyi,
Changping. The construction of suburban metro lines further fueled continued development
in these districts.
Since late 2010, the municipal government has introduced a series of restrictive measures
to stabilize prices. It has restricted the number of housing units a family can purchase,
introduced more government-subsidized housing units, and tightened mortgage standards.
These policies have led to lower market turnover. However, the effect on housing prices has
been limited. Prices have actually picked up since the summer of 2012.
2.3.3 Beijing’s Transportation System
Beijing offers a sophisticated transportation network that comprises of roads, metro lines,
railways and an international airport. To meet the needs of rapid urbanization, Beijing’s
transportation system is under constant growth and reconstruction. This section provides
background information on the road network and public transit system.
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The Road Network
Beijing possesses a vast network of roads - five ring roads, nine radial toll expressways that
connect the city center and suburban areas, eleven China National Highways that depart
from Beijing in all directions, and thousands of local roads and streets. The 2nd11 to 5th
Ring Roads were built before 2003, and the 6th Ring Road was completed in September
2009. Most of the expressways and China National Highways were built in the early 2000s
or even earlier.
With so much new road and transit capacity every year, Beijing remains the second most
congested city in the world. With more than 5 million registered cars on its roads, Beijing’s
city center is often gridlocked - traffic congestion is widespread within the 5th Ring Road
which divides the urban and suburban areas. According to Beijing Transportation Research
Center, within the 5th Ring Road, the average speed during peak hours in 2010 was only 20
kilometers per hour (12.4 miles per hour). To combat congestion, the municipal government
has implemented a number of policy rules:
1. The government continues to invest heavily in transportation infrastructure, with a
focus on expressways and metro lines.
2. The government reduced public transportation fares in an attempt to encourage greater
ridership of public transportation.
3. Since April 2010, the government has adopted odd-even traffic restriction on alternative
weekdays. Respectively from Monday to Friday, cars with number plates ending with
1&6, 2&7, 3&8, 4&9, and 5&0 were restricted within the 5th Ring Road. This policy
would have banned one-fifth of the cars on Beijing’s roads if there had been no change
in demand.
11The 2nd Ring Road is the shortest ring road in Beijing. Within it lies the Forbidden City.
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4. Since 2011, the government has imposed a quota of 240,000 new car licenses each year.
Residents have to participate in monthly lotteries in order to obtain a new license.
5. In April 2011, the municipal government substantially increased parking fees in the
urban area, which may have further reduced traffic congestion.
However, these policy changes have only achieved a limited success in curbing traffic con-
gestion. With ever growing population and car ownership, Beijing’s roads remain gridlocked
during peak hours, especially around the city center.
The Metropolitan Metro System
Beijing’s metro system was proposed in 1953, and its first metro line opened in 1969. The
network has grown to 15 lines, 192 stations and 372 kilometers (231 miles) of track in
operation. Among the world’s metro systems, Beijing’s metro network ranks fourth in track
length after those of Shanghai, London and Seoul, and fourth in annual ridership after those
of Tokyo, Seoul, and Moscow. Although it is the oldest metro system in mainland China,
Beijing’s metro system did not grow quickly until 2001, when the city won the bid to host the
2008 Summer Olympic Games. As of 2001, the city only had two metro lines in operation,
mainly serving the city center. From 2002 and 2008, the municipal government invested 63.8
billion yuan ($7.69 billion) in new metro projects. Total ridership reached 2.18 billion in
2011 from 1.2 billion in 2008. The municipal government plans to achieve a total of 19 lines
and 561 kilometers (349 miles) by 2015.
Responding to the global recession of 2008-2009, the Chinese government on November
10, 2008 announced a four-trillion-yuan ($586 billion) economic stimulus package. After
the announcement, Beijing’s Urban Planning Commission further expedited its metro plans,
with a focus on suburban metro lines (surface light rails) that connect urban fringes and
suburban districts. In November 2008, three such lines - Lines 15, the Changping Line,
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and the Fangshan Line - were announced (see Figure 2.3). They collectively added 108
kilometers (67 miles) of tracks, a near 50% increase, making Beijing’s metro system the
fourth longest in the world, just behind Seoul’s Metropolitan Subway. Part of the paper
studies the announcement effect of these suburban lines on housing prices.
The City Bus Network
The first bus route in Beijing was established in 1935. The City Bus system has developed
rapidly since then, reaching 96 routes in 1975. In 1980, Beijing Public Transport Holdings,
Ltd. (BPT) was established, and this state-owned enterprise became the main bus and
trolleybus operator in the city. As of 2011, BPT operated over 28,000 buses (including
trolleybuses) on 948 bus routes and delivered 4.89 billion rides in 2011. The bus network
covers all districts in Beijing.
2.4 Data Description
This study relies upon longitudinal data on Beijing’s residential property market as well as
detailed information on transport infrastructure and congestion patterns. In this section I
describe the steps in constructing the dataset, and provide relevant summary statistics.
2.4.1 Property Prices, Attributes and Location
To kick off the sale of a new residential property in Beijing, a developer is required to
submit a presale application to Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development (“the Commission” thereafter). Upon approval, the Commission publishes on
its website basic information about the property, which contains the property’s name and
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location, developer’s name, land lease term,12 and approved date for sale. The Commission
maintains a list of all new residential properties since 1996.
Using this database, I identify all residential properties going on sale between 2003 and
2005. The sample starts in 2003, when Beijing’s residential real estate market began to
take off, and ends in 2005 since transportation data are not available for years before 2005.
This yields a balanced panel dataset. Excluding low-income and rental housing projects, the
sample yields 1,152 unique commercial residential properties.
From SouFun Holdings Limited (NYSE: SFUN), the largest real estate data vendor in
China, I obtain monthly average list prices for each of these properties for the period January
2007 – June 2011. Given that Beijing’s housing market remained red hot during this period,
the list prices were likely to be quite close to transaction prices. I construct annual list
prices for each property for the period 2005–2011. Major property-level attributes are also
obtained from SouFun, which are cross-checked with information from the Commission and
other data vendors. These property-level attributes include GPS location, total floor area,13
average size per housing unit, floor area ratio14 (FAR), green plot ratio15 (GPR), monthly
maintenance fee, land-lease term, among other variables.
For local amenities, I utilize a list of 169 major municipal parks from Beijing Municipal
Administration Center of Parks, as well as their GPS locations from Google Earth. 64 city-
wide core high schools16 are also located using information released by Beijing Municipal
12All land in China is owned by the government, and can be leased for development. The land lease terms
are 70 years for residential use, 40 years for commercial use, 50 years for industrial or mixed use.
13Total floor area is the square footage that is located completely above grade, developed on a permanent
foundation, is heated for use in all four seasons and has electrical service.
14Floor area ratio = (total floor areas of property)/(land areas of property).
15Green plot ratio = (total greenery areas of property)/(land areas of property).
16Chinese high schools are grouped categorized into two groupings: core high schools and common high
schools. Core high schools were designated before the market reforms of the 1980s. Approximately 15% of
Beijing’s high schools are core schools. Core high schools receive more funding from local governments and
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Commission of Education. All geographical information is imported into ArcGIS in order to
measure relevant distances.
Figure 2.5 shows that the 1,152 new housing properties are spatially distributed quite
evenly across the entire urban area. Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of this dataset.
The average list price is about 16,961 yuan per square meter ($248.3 per square foot in
December 2011) for the period January 2007 – June 2011, with an average unit size of 170
square meters (15.8 square feet). The average property has 991 housing units and is 18.8
kilometers (11.7 miles) from the City Center.
2.4.2 Road Congestion
From Beijing Transportation Research Center, I obtain average morning peak-hour speeds
(kilometers per hour) for major roads in Beijing. These are a series of spatial maps spanning
the period 2005-2011 (see Figure 2.7 for the 2009 map). The 2008 map only spans three
months around Beijing Olympics and does not reflect traffic conditions throughout the year,
thus I exclude data in that year. I also use speed-limit maps for the City’s major roads from
Beijing Traffic Management Bureau (see Figure 2.8 for the 2009 map). In these maps, travel
speeds are color coded. Purple represents the slowest speed (0-10 kilometers per hour), while
blue renders the fastest speed (greater than 60 kilometers per hour). Importing these spatial
data into ArcGIS, I am able to calculate the shortest commute time17 from each property to
the city center. Assuming that there are 250 workdays annually, and morning and evening
commute times are roughly the same, I compute annual delay hours as below:
Annual delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours – One-way travel hours at the speed limit)×2×250
are allowed to set more selective entry requirements.
17Alternatively, I can use the shortest route from each property to the city center, and then calculate the
associated travel time.
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To facilitate comparison of congestion across properties, for each property I scale the
delay time by the corresponded travel time without delay.18 This so-called “congestion
index” represents how much time is lost due to traffic congestion per hour of drive without
congestion.
Congestion Index = Annual delay hoursAnnual travel hours at the speed limit
Table 2.2 shows that for the period 2005-2011, workers living in these properties experi-
enced an annual delay of 285.9 hours during their commutes. The average congestion index
is 1.9.
It is worth noting that I make an important assumption that workers drive to work. To
the extent that many people in Beijing take the bus to work, the variable – annual delay time
– may be underestimated. This is because buses make stops along the way, and workers have
to walk to bus stops, all of which take extra time. This has implications for my estimation,
and will be discussed in Subsection 2.5.2.
2.4.3 Metro Lines and Bus Routes
To study the announcement effect of new metro lines, I identify the locations of three sub-
urban metro lines whose construction was announced in November 2008. Each line connects
the city center and a suburban commercial hub. From Google Earth, I obtain GPS locations
of metro stations along the Changping Line, Fangshan Line and Line 15 (see Figure 2.4).
There are a total of 29 stations. Furthermore, I locate planned stations for the three metro
lines (see Figure 2.5). Beijing had two city-wide transportation plans – in 2000 and June
2007, respectively. The 2000 Plan focuses on inner city metro lines, while the 2007 Plan
provides a detailed plan of suburban metro lines (see Figure 2.6 for the 2007 plan). For
18I also use an alternative “congestion index,” which is calculated by scaling delay time by travel distance.
Using this index yields similar results.
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this study, I use the latter plan. Comparing the built stations and the planned ones, one
discovers that some stations deviated substantially from their planned locations. Section 2.5
explains why these deviations can be considered exogenous to properties in my sample. I
also locate all existing metro stations in Beijing. The average property is 11.4 kilometers
(7.1 miles) to the closest suburban metro station, and is 5.8 kilometers (3.6 miles) to the
closest existing metro station.
The number of bus routes at each property is acquired from SouFun. The average prop-
erty has access to 7.6 bus routes.
2.5 Traffic Congestion, Public Transport and Housing Prices
2.5.1 Econometric Framework
This section studies whether road congestion, as well as the access to public transportation,
has been capitalized into the value of residential properties in Beijing. I measure traffic
congestion by annual delay hours, which is the difference between actual annual commute
time and annual commute time at the speed limit. Again, let’s assume that Beijing is a
monocentric city and all workers travel to the CBD to work. Following Coulson and Engle
(1987), I express the annual cost of commuting to the city center by
C = N
[







N = number of (one-way) commuting journeys per year
D = daily delay time to the city center (in hours)
L = daily commuting time to the city center at limit-speed (in hours)
K = value of time (yuan per hour)
Q = price of gasoline (in yuan per liter)
M = automobile mileage (in kilometers per liter)
X = distance to the city center (in kilometers)
O = other monetary costs of commuting (in yuan per kilometer)
F = Annual fixed costs of owning a car such as taxes and insurance
The first term in the bracket represents the time cost of commuting and the second term
represents the gasoline cost. The third term expresses miscellaneous costs associated with
commuting, such as tolls and gasoline costs during delays. Since L = X
S
where S is the










In equation (2.9), the annual commuting cost C is a linear function in annual delay hours
and distance to the city center. In the hedonic pricing function (Rosen, 1974), expected
commuting cost should be capitalized into housing prices. Since workers form expectations
of future congestion based on current congestion situation (in a linear fashion), we can write
the hedonic pricing function as
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log(Pijt) = α + θ · Cit + γ ·Dist_Metroit + ρ ·Busit +X ′iβt + ψjt + ijt
where Pijt represents the logarithm of the list price for property i in district j in year t.
Cit represents the total commuting cost at property i in year t. Dist_Metroit is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the distance between property i and the closest existing metro
station is less than one kilometer.19 Busit represents the number of bus routes available
at property i in year t. In addition, Xi is a vector of major property-level time-invariant
attributes such as average unit size and floor area ratio. District-year fixed-effects ψjt control
for time-varying district-level characteristics. ijt is an error term, which represents other
unobservable costs. Plugging in equation (2.9), we obtain
log(Pijt) = α+ δ ·Delayit+κ ·Dist_Centeri+γ ·Dist_Metroit+ρ ·Busit+X ′iβt+ψjt+ ijt
(2.10)
Equation (2.10) is the main empirical equation, in which total commuting cost is decom-
posed into two parts – commuting costs associated with traffic delays and those associated
with travel distance (travel at the speed limit). I use time-varying coefficients βt in order to
obtain consistent estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the property level.
I fit OLS regressions for equation (2.10), and the coefficient on Delayit is expected to be
negative, reflecting the prediction that costs associated with traffic delays are factored into
housing prices. I also replace Delayit with an alternative measure of traffic congestion, the
congestion index constructed in Subsection 2.4.2. For robustness checks, I replace Delayit
with annual total commuting hours. On the other hand, the coefficient on Dist_Metroit
is expected to be positive, reflecting the fact that households are willing to pay a premium
for access to rapid transit. However, it is a priori not clear whether more bus connections
19One kilometer is the maximum walking distance from properties to metro stations in Beijing, according
to studies on Beijing’s metro system (see He, 2005).
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necessarily translate into a higher housing price. As discussed in Subsection 2.5.4, although
an increasing number of bus routes gives local residents more transport choices, the buses
themselves may cause additional traffic delays that could have an adverse effect on housing
prices.
For the effects of congestion on housing prices, unbiased OLS estimates require no corre-
lation between the error term ijt and the regressor Delayit, conditional on controls and the
property and district-year fixed effects. The district-year fixed effects control for regional
factors that may systematically affect delay times. However, idiosyncratic factors that affect
travel time from one property to the city center cause less concern. It is because traffic
congestion depends on the dynamics of the entire road network, so any property level at-
tributes are unlikely to systematically affect delay times. Numerous studies (e.g., Malalur,
2011) have shown that congestion spots on a large road network are stochastic in nature.
Nevertheless, as robustness checks, I present additional evidence in Subsection 2.5.3 using
the instrumental variable approach.
2.5.2 Effects of Traffic Congestion
Before conducting the regression analysis, it is useful to visualize the relationship between
delay time and housing prices over time. I estimate equation (2.10) year by year. Figure 2.9
plots the series of coefficients on Delayit. Note that the coefficient is fairly stable over the
years, suggesting people’s expectation of future congestion is stable.
I then estimate how annual morning delay time affects housing prices. To precisely
estimate the effect of congestion on housing prices, I restrict the sample to houses within 50
kilometers of the city center. Table 2.3 shows the OLS estimates from equation (2.10). In
column (1), I only include property and district-year fixed effects. The result shows that one
standard deviation, 104.5 hours annually, increase in peak-hour delay time leads to a 3.1%
decrease in housing prices. The estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column
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(2), I add the Euclidean distance from property i to the city center. Now the property fixed
effects disappear because of multicollinearity. The coefficient on annual delay hours remains
positive and significant, and the magnitude is larger than that in column (1). However,
omitted property heterogeneity may potentially bias the finding. To address such a concern,
in columns (3) to (5) I add an increasing number of property-level control variables. Column
(3) includes property characteristics such as unit size, the floor area ratio, and maintenance
fees. Column (4) includes additional property attributes such as amenities and transport
accessibility. The estimated effect of delay time now is close to that in column (1), and it is
significant at the 1% level.
Overall, these results indicate that a half-hour delay per day translates into a 3.8%
decrease in housing prices. This order of magnitude seems large. However, the estimate is
based on the assumption that all workers drive to work in Beijing. To the extent that some
people in Beijing take the bus to work (bus rides often increase the delay time on the same
route given same traffic conditions), I may have underestimated the average delay time in
the sample. Even so, by assuming that every worker rides the bus to work, and that bus
rides double the delay time I calculate, the effect is still economically significant (half an
hour delay per day translates into a 1.9% decrease in housing prices).
It is worth noting that most control variables also capture variations in housing prices.
For example, increasing distance to the city center by one kilometer (0.62 miles) is associated
with a decline in housing prices of about 1.3%. This order of magnitude is consistent with
the figures found in Subsection 2.6.2. Clearly, traffic congestion exerts additional costs on
workers other than the regular traffic costs which are approximated by the distance to the
city center.
Alternatively, I use the congestion index (defined in Subsection 2.4.2) to estimate how
traffic congestion affects housing prices. Table 2.4 presents the results. As before, the
coefficient on Congestion_Index is not significantly affected by the addition of a large set
88
of control variables between columns (1) and (4). The magnitude of the estimates suggests
that a one unit increase in the congestion index tends to lower housing prices by 8.1%-13.2%,
other things being equal. Across the four regression specifications, most control variables
also capture variations in housing prices.
Third, instead of using annual delay time, I use annual total commuting hours as the
independent variable of interest. As shown in Table 2.5, total commuting time across different
specifications is negatively associated with housing prices. This is not surprising in that the
theory predicts that commuting costs are capitalized into housing prices. Interestingly, the
coefficient on the distance to the city center is not statistically significant at 10%. Since the
distance is a proxy for the regular commuting hours without congestion (which is part of
total commuting time), the distance effect is completely absorbed by the total-commuting
effect.
2.5.3 The Instrumental Variable Approach
The OLS estimates in Subsection 2.5.2 demonstrate a negative relationship between delay
time and housing prices. Although we have argued that any property level attributes are
unlikely to systematically affect delay time, as a robustness check, I use the completion of
Metro Line 420 (a major urban subway line completed in 2009) as an instrument for the
delay time. This produces the following first-stage equation:
Delayit =α + δ1 ·Dist_L4i · Post_Constrt + δ2 ·Dist_L4i + δ3 · Post_Constrt
+ κ ·Disti + γ ·Dist_Metroit + ρ ·Busit +X ′iβt + ψjt + ijt
in which Dist_L4i equals 1 if property i is located within one kilometer of the nearest
20Line 4 Subway is the 9th subway line in Beijing’s mass transit network. It entered into operation on
September 28, 2009, and runs from north to south in the western part of the city. The green line in figure
2.4 represents the No. 4 Subway.
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Line 4 metro station, and the indicator Post_Constrt equals 1 for years after 2009, and
equals 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined as in equation (2.10). The identification
assumption is that the completion of Metro Line 4 affected delay hours for locations along the
line, but were uncorrelated with property level characteristics that affected housing prices.
I show strong evidence to justify the first assumption, and argue that the completion of
the metro line is an exogenous event which is unlikely to be correlated with property level
attributes. Similar to findings in Section 2.5, the distance dummy Dist_L4i is unlikely to
be correlated with property level attributes.
The instrumental variable estimates are predicted to be larger than the OLS estimates
if housing prices are negatively correlated with delay time due to reverse causality. It could
be the case that car ownership at expensive properties was higher which led to more local
congestion. The regressions in Table 2.6 replicate those in Table 2.3 but replace OLS results
with two-stage least squares estimates. The first stage F-statistics are always larger than
10 (see e.g., Staiger and Stock, 1997). Across the four specifications, the instrument is
negatively correlated with delay time (statistically significant at 1% level). This indicates
that the completion of Line 4 reduced delay hours for properties along the line, due to
the possibility that few residents drive or take the bus to work in these neighborhoods. In
column (1), with only property and district-year fixed effects, the estimated coefficient is
-0.0012 (significant at the 1% level), which is larger than the corresponding OLS estimate.
In columns (2) to (4), results with additional controls are reported. The coefficients are
consistently larger than the OLS counterparts. It is likely that some form of endogeneity or
measure error in delay time is operating against the results. This implies that the true effect
of traffic congestion may be larger than the OLS estimates suggest. However, the magnitudes
in the IV estimates are almost four times as large. An appropriate interpretation of the IV
results may be to confirm the existence of a negative causation from traffic congestion to
housing prices, without reading much into the magnitudes.
90
2.5.4 The Role of Public Transportation
Prediction 5 shows that access to metro lines is priced in property values. Since these rapid
transit lines reduce the opportunity cost involved in travel, more disposal income could be
used to purchase housing services. This implies that γ in equation (2.10) is expected to be
positive. Column (4) of Table 2.3 shows that properties within one kilometer of the closest
metro station are 3.9% more expensive than those further away from metro stations, other
things being equal. Replacing delay hours with the congestion index or total commute hours,
we have similar results, as shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. This difference is comparable to
about 30 minutes of delay time each day.
To see the heterogeneous effect of metro lines on values of properties with different degrees
of congestion, I further include an interaction term Delayit ·Dist_Metroit in equation (2.10).
The coefficient on this interaction term is expected to be positive because in more congested
residential areas, the value of accessibility to metro lines is greater. In other words, the
effect of congestion on housing prices would be smaller. In column (5) of Table 2.5 I re-run
regression (2.10) with the inclusion of this interaction term. As predicted, the estimated
coefficient is positive.
On the other hand, additional bus routes do not necessarily lead to higher housing prices.
Due to the severe congestion situation in Beijing, the benefit of additional bus routes may
be minimal. As shown in column (4) of Table 2.3, the coefficient on the number of bus
routes is economically small, and is not statistically significant. With alternative measures
of congestion, the coefficient remains small and statistically insignificant (Tables 2.4 and
2.5).
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2.6 The Announcement Effect on Housing Prices
In Subsection 2.5.4, I show that proximity to existing metro lines is captilized into housing
prices in Beijing. However, the distance between a property and its closest metro station
may not be exogenous. Several existing metro lines – most of the gray lines in Figure 2.4 –
were either built before or during the construction of the housing properties in my sample.21
Developers could potentially choose to purchase land close to these existing transit lines,22
rendering the distance endogenous. To overcome this obstacle, I utilize three of the new
suburban metro lines built between April 2009 and December 2010, to study the effect of
access to public transportation on traffic congestion and housing prices.
2.6.1 Econometric Framework: Difference-in-Differences
This section examines whether the announcement of three suburban metro lines, the Chang-
ping Line, Fangshan Line and Line 15, triggered a jump in prices of properties along the
lines, compared with those in other parts of Beijing. As mentioned in Subsection 2.3.3, the
November 2008 announcement was part of China’s stimulus package responding to the global
recession of 2008-2009. The announcement of these three lines was widely unexpected.23 This
enables me to make causal claims regarding these construction announcements.
21Properties in my sample went on sale between 2003 and 2005. No.1 and No.2 Subway Lines were built
before 2003, and several other lines started construction between 1999 and 2005.
22Although Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning claims to follow strict urban planning guide-
lines, developers occasionally could influence the zoning process.
23The 2008-2009 Chinese economic stimulus plan was an attempt to minimize the impact of the global
financial crisis on the world’s second largest economy. To Chinese leaders, the financial crisis, as well as
the ensuing economic slowdown was unexpected. The Economic Times reported on November 10, 2008 that
“The plan follows an unexpectedly sharp slowdown in economic growth that has raised the prospect of job
losses and unrest.”
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As a baseline, I estimate the following hedonic pricing function:
log(Pijt) = α + δ1 ·Di · Postt + δ2 ·Di + δ3 · Postt +X ′1iβt +X ′2itγ + ψjq + ijt (2.11)
The logarithm of the price24 for property i in district j in month t is a function of: a
binary variable Di, which equals 1 under either of two conditions: (1) if property i is located
within one kilometer of the nearest new metro station, or (2) property i is in a suburban
commercial hub; an indicator Postt, which equals 1 for months after the announcement
month; major property-level time-invariant attributes X1i and time-varying attributes X2it
such as distance to the nearest existing metro station. I also include district-quarter fixed-
effects ψjq which control for time-varying district-level characteristics. I use time-varying
coefficients βt in order to obtain consistent estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the
property level. δ1 is a difference-in-differences estimator. If prices of properties along the
metro lines jumps after the announcement relative to those in other parts of the city, δ1 > 0.
The treatment group includes properties within one kilometer of the nearest metro sta-
tion, given that one kilometer is the maximum walking distance, according to various studies
on Beijing’s metro system (see He, 2005). Beyond one kilometer, people would take the bus
or drive to work. The treatment group also contains properties in suburban commercial hubs
(even if they are not within walking distance to the metro stations) insofar as the metro lines
will be their primary mode of transportation to reach the city center.25
I begin by estimating equation (2.11) using OLS. Unbiased OLS estimates require no
correlation between the error term ijt and the regressor Di, conditional on controls and
24I use nominal prices throughout the paper because the difference-in-differences coefficient estimates the
differential trend in housing prices regardless of nominal or real prices. Time fixed effects also take into
account the effect of inflation.
25Residents in suburban commercial hubs living beyond walking distance to metro stations often take the
bus to the stations, and use the metro as their main transportation mode.
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the property and district-year fixed effects. This requirement would fail if metro stations
were constructed in areas that were expected to experience high growth in housing prices.
However, this type of reverse causality is less of a concern as it will likely inflict a negative
bias on my results. In other words, absent reverse causality, the magnitudes may be even
larger.
2.6.2 Baseline Results
Before we conduct the regression analysis, it is useful to visualize whether the announcement
of these suburban lines triggers a jump in prices of properties along the lines. I first regress
the logarithm of monthly prices log(Pijt) on the distance dummy Di, property fixed-effects
and district-quarter fixed-effects. The regressions are carried out month by month for the
period July 2006 – June 2011. Figure 2.10 plots the series of coefficients on the distance
dummy. Note that there is a sharp increase in the coefficients in the months following
November 2008. This is consistent with the notion that the announcement has a larger
positive effect on prices of properties in the proximity of the metro stations. It is worth
mentioning that the coefficients experience a sharp decline around September 2009, when
the urban Metro Line 4 began its operation. The coefficients also has a sizable increase after
December 2010 when the three suburban lines were completed.
To precisely estimate the announcement effect on housing prices, I restrict the sample
period to six months before and after the announcement, which is May 2008 to May 2009.
Table 2.7 shows the OLS estimates from equation (2.11). In column (1), I only include
property and district-quarter fixed-effects. The result shows that within a six-month window,
the construction announcement leads to an increase in prices of properties along the metro
lines that are 3.3% higher than those of the rest. This translates to a difference of 560 yuan
per square meter ($8.0 per square foot in January 2009). In columns (2) to (5), results
with additional controls are reported. The estimated announcement effect (3.1%-3.6%) on
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housing prices is stable to the addition of these control variables, and it remains significant
at the 1% level.
It is worth noting that most control variables also capture variations in housing prices.
For example, increasing the distance to the city center by one kilometer (0.62 miles) correlates
with a decline in housing prices of about 1.8%. When the floor area ratio increases by 1
unit, housing prices tend to fall by 1.7%.
2.6.3 Effects During the Whole Sample Period
In addition to the announcement effect, it is interesting to explore whether the issuance
of the June 2007 Metro Plan or the completion of the metro lines (December 2010) had
any effects on housing prices. The sample is extended to the period January 2007 – June
2011.26 To test these potential effects, I add two interactions terms to equation (2.11):
E(Di) · Post_Plant and Di · Post_Constrt, where E(Di) denotes the distance (a dummy
variable as Di) between a property and its closest metro station on the 2007 Plan. Insofar
as prices of properties along the metro lines jump after the 2007 Metro Plan was released,
the coefficient on E(Di) · Post_Plant is positive. Similarly, as property prices responded
differentially to the completion of the metro lines, the coefficient on Di · Post_Constrt is
positive.
Table 2.8 shows the associated estimates. In column (1), I only include property and
district-quarter fixed-effects. The result shows that between January 2007 and June 2011, the
construction announcement (project completion) leads to an increase in prices of properties
along the metro lines that is 10.4% (4.1%) higher than those of the rest. On the other hand,
the release of the Metro Plan has little effect on housing prices. Between columns (2) and
26The beginning of this series is six months before the plan was issued, and six months after the lines were
completed.
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(4), I add an increasing number of property-level control variables,27 such as the distance to
the city center and unit size. The coefficients on the three interaction terms remain stable
and consistent with those found in column (1).
2.6.4 Heterogeneous Announcement Effects
Housing prices in more congested areas are predicted to be more responsive to announcements
of new metro lines (Prediction 6). To test this hypothesis, I first divide the sample into two
groups. Properties in Group A are located in congested areas, whose congestion indices
(defined in Subsection 2.4.2) in 2007 are above the median index. Properties in Group B are
located in less congested places, whose congestion indices in 2007 are below the median one.
I then estimate equation (2.11) for these two groups separately. The estimated coefficient δ1
for Group A is predicted to be larger than that for Group B.
Panel A in Table 2.9 shows the estimates of announcement effects for Group A. Between
columns (1) to (4), I add an increasing number of property-level controls. The result indicates
that for congested areas, the construction announcement leads to an increase in prices of
properties along the metro lines that are 3.7% higher than those of the rest. However, for
less congested places, the corresponding coefficients are neither economically nor statistically
significant at the 5% level, as shown in Panel B. These results suggest that the announcement
effect is larger for more congested areas.
2.7 Discussion
The empirical results in Subsection 2.5.2 are appealing in that they provide necessary infor-
mation for calculating the cost of traffic congestion in Beijing. A lower bound of this cost is
the market price of avoiding delay as reflected in higher housing prices. This lower bound
27The property fixed-effects disappear because of multicollinearity.
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should largely capture the private costs of congestion, while public costs, such as increased
air pollution, are not internalized by homeowners. There are two major categories of private
costs due to congestion – monetary costs and non-pecuniary costs. Monetary costs include
lost wages and business opportunities associated with delay time, extra gasoline expendi-
tures, and wear and tear on vehicles as a result of frequent acceleration and braking while
idling. Non-pecuniary costs, on the other hand, include health issues resulting from higher
levels of stress and frustration. According to IBM’s 2011 Global Commuter Pain Survey,
42% of people say their stress level has increased and 35% say they get angry because of
traffic congestion.
This paper studies costs of traffic congestion, as well as benefits of new transit lines, as
reflected in housing prices. As shown in the model, however, there is a more direct link
between rents and transport accessibility. For example, rents should not respond to the
announcement of the new transit lines; rather they will increase only when the line is built.
Due to data constraint, in this paper I study how housing prices respond to infrastructure.
Studying how rents and rent-to-price ratios react to congestion and transport infrastructure
is left to future work.
I use nominal prices throughout the paper since time fixed effects take into account
the effect of inflation. In addition, the difference-in-differences coefficients estimate the
differential trend in housing prices regardless of nominal or real prices. However, it will be
interesting to measure how prices respond to congestion and accessibility in real terms. After
all, Beijing experienced high inflation during the sample period.
The paper studies the interplay between transport accessibility and property values. In
reality, transportation modes may have agglomeration effects: they may affect firm produc-
tivity and flows of goods. Cost-benefit analysis of the effects of transportation on productivity
in urban areas is worth further study (see e.g., Mun and Yonekawa, 2006; Weisbrod, Vary
and Treyz, 2007; Hartgen and Fields, 2009).
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2.8 Conclusion
Existing urban economic theory states that traffic congestion is welfare reducing. In practice,
policymakers in congested cities invest heavily in public transit systems to reduce transporta-
tion costs. However, not all public transit modes are created equal – those that reduce traffic
congestion are the most desirable. Using a unique panel dataset of all residential properties
on sale between 2003 and 2005 in Beijing, I first show that traffic congestion has a large
adverse effect on housing prices. A half-hour increase in daily delay time (drive time) is
associated with a 3.8% decrease in housing prices. This implies that there may be a huge
welfare cost to congestion. first papers that use micro-level congestion data to assess property
values.
Furthermore, I show that announcements of metro line construction inflate prices of
properties near future stations – the difference-in-difference coefficient of 3.3% translates to
a difference of 560 yuan per square meter ($8.0 per square foot). The increase is even more
staggering for more congested areas. This suggests that metro lines are effective in reducing
the impact of congestion. The magnitude of capitalization effects appears to be larger than
findings in developed countries (e.g., McMillen and McDonald, 2004; Gatzlaff and Smith,
1993), possibly due to lower car ownership as well as higher density. However, additional
bus routes are not capitalized into prices because buses move slowly in the gridlocked city,
often exacerbating rather than alleviating congestion.
I conclude that the mere quantity of public transit services may not increase welfare. In
congested cities, workers seem to attach different premiums to different public transit modes.
My results show that housing prices are sensitive to new metro lines but not to additional
bus routes. The reason may be that in extremely congested cities, additional bus routes
exacerbate rather than alleviate congestion. Although further cost-benefit analysis needs to
be applied to both transit modes (e.g., Winston, 2007), it is reasonable to argue that the
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metro system may be more desirable in megacities. Note that this paper does not discuss
direct measures that could curb traffic congestion, such as congestion pricing and highway
investment (see e.g., Vickrey, 1969 and Leape, 2006 for a discussion). As of November 2012,
the Beijing Municipal Government was discussing a possible congestion charge in the urban
area, and I plan to analyze it in a follow-up study.
While the findings in this paper are promising, it does not address the interplay between
mass transit and traffic congestion, as well as the welfare implications of unpredictable
congestion. Promising areas for future work include the following: how transport accessibility
affects workers’ employment decisions as well as their location choice; and how different types
of property developers (state-owned enterprises versus private developers) react to changes
in transport accessibility.
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Figure 2.1: The Effect of a New Transit Line on Urban Form
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Notes: This figure is similar to Figure 1 in Baum-Snow (2007).    is the angle separating the transit commuting 
region and the rest.   is the original urban fringe, and 
  
   
 is the expanded urban fringe due to the transit line. 
An example commute is a case in which residents drive to the transit line via concentric circles around the 















    
Example 
commute 
Notes: This figure is similar to Figure 1 in Baum-Snow (2007). φ¯ is the angle separating the transit
commuting region and the rest. x¯ is the original urban fringe, and x¯γ+φ is the expanded urban fringe due
to the transit line. An example commute is a case in which residents drive to the transit line via concentric
circles around the origin, and then take the transit to the CBD.
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Figure 2.2: Beijing District Level Map
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Figure 2.3: Housing Prices and Population Growth in Beijing
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Figure 3.  Housing Prices and Population Growth in Beijing 
 
Notes: This figure plots transaction prices for commercial housing properties and resident population in 
Beijing. The solid line (left axis) plots housing prices per square meter. The dashed line (right axis) plots total 
resident population in Beijing. Housing prices are from SouFun Holdings Limited, and population data are 






















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Housing Price 





Notes: This figure plots transaction prices for commercial housing properties and resident population in
Beijing. The solid line (left axis) plots housing prices per square meter. The dashed line (right axis) plots
total resident population in Beijing. Housing prices are from SouFun Holdings Limited, and population data
are from Beijing Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012).
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Figure 2.4: Three Suburban Metro Lines in Beijing
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Notes: The three suburban metro lines – Changping Line, Fangshan Line and No. 15 Line – are in brown. The 
lines were announced in November 2008. Construction began in April 2009 and ended in December 2010. The 
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Notes: The three suburban metro lines Changping Line, Fangshan Line and No. 15 Line are in brown. The
lines were announced in November 2008. Construction began in April 2009 and ended in December 2010.
The No. 4 Line is in green. The flag represents the city center.
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Figure 2.5: Locations of Properties and Metro Lines
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Figure 5.  Locations of Properties and Metro Lines 
 
Notes: Each dark dot represents a residential property. The three suburban metro lines – Changping Line, 
Fangshan Line and No. 15 Line – are in purple. The dashed line represents the No. 4 Metro Line. The flag 
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Notes: Each r t represents a residential property. The three suburban metro lines Cha ping Line,
Fangshan Line and No. 15 Line are in purple. The dashed line represents the No. 4 Metro Line. The flag
represents the city center.
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Figure 2.6: The June 2007 Metro Plan (Features Suburban Lines)
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Figure 2.7: Congestion Map for Beijing (Morning Peak Hours), 2009
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Figure 2.8: Speed-Limit Map for Beijing, 2009
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Figure 2.9: The Effect of Delay Time on Housing Prices
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Figure 10.  The Effect of Delay Time on Housing Prices 
 
Notes: I regress the logarithm of annual housing prices on annual delay hours and district fixed-effects, in 
which annual delay hours = (daily morning travel hours – one-way travel hours at limit speed)   500. The 
regressions are carried out year by year for the period 2005 – 2011 (excluding 2008). The coefficient on annual 








2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 
Notes: I regress the logarithm of annual housing prices on annual delay hours and district fixed-effects, in
which annual delay ho rs = (daily morning travel hou s one-way travel hou s at speed limit)×500. The
regressions are carried out year by year for the period 2005-2011 (excluding 2008). The coefficient on annual
delay hours is then plotted out for this period.
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Figure 2.10: Difference in Monthly Housing Prices (Properties Along the Metro Lines Versus the Rest)
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Figure 11.  Difference in Monthly Housing Prices (Properties along the metro lines versus the rest)  
 
Notes: I regress the logarithm of monthly housing prices on 1{along suburban line} and district fixed-effects, in which 1{along suburban line} equals 1 if 
the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban metro station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. The regressions are carried out 




















































































































































the Metro lines 
Notes: I regress the logarithm of m nthly ousing prices on 1{along suburban li e} and district fixed- ffects, in whic 1{along sub rban line}
equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban metro station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. The
regressions are carried out month by month for the period July 2006 June 2011. The coefficient on 1{along suburban line} is then plotted
out for this period.
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Table 2.1: Metro Lines in Operation as of December 31, 2011
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Table 1.  Metro Lines in Operation (as of December 31, 2011) 
Line Opened Construction 
Started 
Length (km) Stations (surface) 
1  1999 -- 30.4 23 (2) 
2 1987 -- 23.1 18 
Batong Suburban Line 12/17/2003 12/28/2001 18.9 13(13) 
13 Suburban Line 1/28/2003 12/1/1999 40.9 16(15) 
5 10/7/2007 12/28/2002 27.6 23(7) 
8 (Phase 1) 7/19/2008 5/1/2005 4.5 4 
10 (Phase 1) 7/19/2008 12/27/2003 24.7 22 
4 9/28/2009 8/1/2004 28.2 24(1) 
Yizhuang Suburban Line 12/30/2010 10/16/2008 23.3 14(8) 
Daxing Suburban Line 12/30/2010 10/28/2008 21.7 11(1) 
15 (Phase 1, Sec 1) 12/30/2010 4/11/2009 20.2 8(4) 
Changping Suburban Line 12/30/2010 4/2/2009 21.2 7(6) 
Fangshan Suburban Line 12/30/2010 4/9/2009 24.7 11(9) 
15 (Phase 1, Sec 2) 12/30/2011 4/11/2009 10 5 
9 (South Sec) 12/31/2011 Apr 2007 10.8 9 
 


















Notes: The shaded lines are the focus of this study.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for 1,152 Properties
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics for 1,152 Properties  
Variable Mean Median     Max Min Std Dev 
Monthly list price (yuan/  ), Jan 07 – Jun 11 16,961 14,778 130,399 1,907 9,587 
Annual list price (yuan/  ), 2005-2011 15,969 13,500 95,115 1,810 10,376 
Location and Accessibility      
Distance to city center (km)  18.8 15.6 49.9 2.2 11.1 
Distance to nearest park (km) 2.8 1.9 25.2 0.08 3.0 
Distance to nearest core high school (km) 4.1 3.0 20.8 0.12 3.7 
Distance to nearest suburban-line station (km) 11.4 11.3 47.9 0.13 7.3 
Distance to existing metro line station (km) 5.8 2.9 42.4 0.10 7.0 
Congestion Indicators      
Annual commute hours 449.9 437.6 928.6 63.4 173.1 
Annual delay hours 285.9 281.6 622.4 39.0 104.5 
Congestion index 1.9 1.8 5.4 0.52 0.56 
Property Attributes      
Total floor areas of property (   ) 0.14 0.10 2.5 0.002 0.17 
Housing units within a property 991 650 11,026 1 1,162 
Unit size (square meters) 170.0 136.0 3,000 25 150.8 
Floor area ratio 2.7 2.4 19.6 0.08 1.9 
Green plot ratio 0.37 0.35 0.89 0.10 0.10 
1{interior construction included} 0.26 0 1 0 0.44 
Maintenance fee (yuan/month/  ) 2.7 2.3 18 0 2.1 
No. of parking lot per household 0.88 0.98 3 0.07 0.41 
No. of bus lines 7.6 6 38 0 5.1 
1{central heat} 0.77 1 1 0 0.42 
Frequency       
Properties going on sale in 2003 19.7%     
Properties going on sale in 2004 32.5%     
Properties going on sale in 2005 47.8%     
 
Notes: The sample includes all commercial residential properties going on sale between 2003 and 2005 in 
Beijing. It excludes low-income housing projects and those missing all prices. Annual commute hours = 
Daily morning travel hours   500.  Annual delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours – One-way travel 
hours at the speed limit)   500. Congestion index = (Annual delay hours)/(Annual travel hours at the 
speed limit). Floor area ratio = (total floor areas of property)/(land areas of property). Green plot ratio = 
(total greenery areas of property)/(land areas of property). 1{central heat} equals 1 if the housing units are 







Notes: The sample includes all commercial residential properties going on sale between 2003 and 2005 in
Beijing. It excludes low-income housing projects and those missing all prices. Annual commute hours =
Daily morning travel hours × 50 . Annual rs = (Daily mor ing travel hours One-way travel
hours at the speed limit) × 500. o gestio index = (Annual delay hours)/(Annu l travel hours at the
speed limit). Floor area ratio = (total floor areas of property)/(land areas of property). Green plot ratio =
(total greenery areas of property)/(land areas of property). 1{central heat} equals 1 if the housing units are
centrally heated.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Delay Time on Housing Prices
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Table 3.  The Effect of Delay Time on Housing Prices  
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Annual delay hours -0.0003** -0.0007*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
1{dist to existing metro<1km}    0.039**  
    (0.017)  
1{dist to existing metro<1km}* 
Annual delay hours 
    0.0003*** 
    (0.0001) 
No. of bus lines    0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.010 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dist to nearest park (km)    -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Dist to nearest core school (km)    -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Unit size (square meters)   0.0003* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Floor area ratio   -0.016** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Green plot ratio   0.384*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 
   (0.076) (0.082) (0.081) 
1{interior construction included}   0.045* 0.044** 0.045** 
   (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
Maintenance fee (yuan/month/  )   0.080*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
   (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
No. of parking lot per household    0.097*** 0.097*** 
    (0.015) (0.015) 
1{central heat}    -0.021 -0.020 
    (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 8.892*** 9.342*** 8.880*** 8.872*** 8.879*** 
 (0.030) (0.086) (0.099) (0.116) (0.114) 
Property FE Yes No No No No 
District-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,223 6,223 6,172 6,166 6,166 
R-squared 0.95 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.88 
 
Notes: The sample period is 2005 – 2011 (excluding 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers 
of the city center. Annual delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours – One-way travel hours at the speed 
limit)   500. 1{dist to existing metro < 1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the 
nearest existing metro station. Please refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other 
controls. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
on the property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate 




Notes: The sample period is 2005 2011 (excludes 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers
of the city center. Annual delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours One-way travel hours at the speed
limit) × 500. 1{dist to existing metro < 1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of
the nearest existing metro station. Please refer to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition
of other controls. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered on the property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 2.4: The Congestion Index and Housing Prices
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Table 4.  Relationship between the Congestion Index and Housing Prices  
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Congestion index -0.132** -0.081** -0.084** -0.086* -0.020 
 (0.067) (0.043) (0.041) (0.048) (0.027) 
1{dist to existing metro<1km}    0.040**  
    (0.015)  
1{dist to existing metro<1km}* 
Congestion index 
    0.023*** 
    (0.007) 
No. of bus lines    0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Dist to nearest park (km)    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Dist to nearest core school (km)    -0.005* -0.005* 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Unit size (square meters)   0.0003* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Floor area ratio   -0.013** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Green plot ratio   0.373*** 0.310*** 0.310*** 
   (0.074) (0.084) (0.084) 
1{interior construction included}   0.051** 0.049** 0.049** 
   (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Maintenance fee (yuan/month/  )   0.081*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
   (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
No. of parking lot per household    0.104*** 0.104*** 
    (0.017) (0.017) 
1{central heat}    -0.017 -0.017 
    (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant 8.817*** 9.299*** 8.801*** 8.804*** 8.813*** 
 (0.031) (0.192) (0.156) (0.157) (0.155) 
Property FE Yes No No No No 
District-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,223 6,223 6,172 6,166 6,166 
R-squared 0.95 0.78 0.87 0.88 0.88 
 
Notes: The sample period is 2005 – 2011 (excluding 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers 
of the city center. Congestion index = (Annual delay hours)/(Annual travel hours at the speed limit). 1{dist 
to existing metro < 1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest existing 
metro station. Please refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other controls. 
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the 
property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 




Notes: The sample period is 2005 2011 (excludes 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers of
the city center. Congestion index = (Annual delay hours)/(Annual travel hours at the speed limit). 1{dist
to existing metro < 1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest existing metro
station. Please refer to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition of other controls. Coefficients
are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the property level.
Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Commute Hours on Housing Prices
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Table 5.  The Effect of Commute Hours on Housing Prices 
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Annual commute hours -0.001** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.001** 
 (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
1{dist to existing metro<1km}    0.038**  
    (0.016)  
1{dist to existing metro<1km}* 
Annual commute hours 
    0.0002*** 
    (0.0001) 
No. of bus lines    0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Dist to nearest park (km)    -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Dist to nearest core school (km)    -0.003 -0.003 
    (0.003) (0.002) 
Unit size (square meters)   0.0003* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Floor area ratio   -0.016** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
   (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Green plot ratio   0.385*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 
   (0.078) (0.085) (0.084) 
1{interior construction included}   0.044* 0.044** 0.045** 
   (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
Maintenance fee (yuan/month/  )   0.080*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
   (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
No. of parking lot per household    0.098*** 0.098*** 
    (0.015) (0.015) 
1{central heat}    -0.021 -0.020 
    (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 8.939*** 9.348*** 8.893*** 8.880*** 8.888*** 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.091) (0.113) (0.112) 
Property FE Yes No No No No 
District-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,228 6,228 6,177 6,171 6,166 
R-squared 0.95 0.79 0.88 0.89 0.88 
 
Notes: The sample period is 2005 – 2011 (excluding 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers 
of the city center. Annual commute hours = Daily morning travel hours   500. 1{dist to existing metro < 
1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest existing metro station. Please 
refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other controls. Coefficients are reported 
with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the property level. Time-
varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 




Notes: The sample period is 2005 2011 (excludes 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers of
the city center. Annual commute hours = Daily morning travel hours 500. 1{dist to existing metro < 1km}
equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest existing metro station. Please refer
to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition of other controls. Coefficients are reported with
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the property level. Time-varying
coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels.
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Delay Time on Housing Prices – Instrumental Variable
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Table 6.  The Effect of Delay Time on Housing Prices – Instrumental Variable 
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Annual delay hours -0.001*** -0.0017*** -0.0014** -0.0014** 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
1{dist to existing metro<1km}    0.039*** 
    (0.008) 
No. of bus lines    0.001 
    (0.001) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.006 -0.008* -0.011** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Dist to nearest park (km)    -0.002 
    (0.002) 
Dist to nearest core school (km)    -0.004*** 
    (0.001) 
Unit size (square meters)   0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
   (5.5e-05) (4.9e-05) 
Floor area ratio   -0.018*** -0.015*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Green plot ratio   0.390*** 0.327*** 
   (0.049) (0.050) 
1{interior construction included}   0.040*** 0.043*** 
   (0.010) (0.009) 
Maintenance fee (yuan/month/  )   0.078*** 0.072*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
No. of parking lot per household    0.094*** 
    (0.015) 
1{central heat}    -0.023*** 
    (0.009) 
Constant 9.422*** 9.454*** 8.994*** 8.955*** 
 (0.121) (0.099) (0.119) (0.125) 
Property FE Yes No No No 
District-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-Statistics 21.0 23.5 16.9 17.6 
Observations 6,223 6,223 6,172 6,166 
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.89 
 
Notes: The sample period is 2005 – 2011 (excluding 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers 
of the city center. Annual delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours – One-way travel hours at the speed 
limit)   500. 1{dist to existing metro < 1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the 
nearest existing metro station. Please refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other 
controls. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
on the property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate 





Notes: The sample period is 2005 2011 (excludes 2008). It includes all properties within 50 kilometers
of the city center. Annual delay hours = (Daily morning travel hours One-way travel hours at the speed
limit) × 500. 1{dist to existing metro < 1km} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of
the nearest existing metro station. Please refer to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition
of other controls. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered on the property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Construction Announcement on Housing Prices
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Table 7.  The Effect of Construction Announcement on Housing Prices 
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
1{along suburban line}*Post 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.032** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
1{along suburban line}  0.079** 0.055 0.053 
  (0.034) (0.040) (0.045) 
Post -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.061*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.019*** -0.016** -0.018*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Location and Accessibility     
Annual delay hours    -0.0005** 
    (0.0002) 
1{dist to existing metro<1km}    0.069*** 
    (0.015) 
No. of bus lines    0.002 
    (0.002) 
Dist to nearest park (km)    -0.003 
    (0.003) 
Dist to nearest core school (km)    -0.004 
    (0.003) 
Property Attributes     
Unit size (square meters)   0.0004* 0.0003 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Floor area ratio   -0.014*** -0.017*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Green plot ratio   0.250** 0.233** 
   (0.112) (0.098) 
1{interior construction included}   0.041 0.032 
   (0.030) (0.027) 
Maintenance fee (yuan/month/  )   0.081*** 0.073*** 
   (0.016) (0.013) 
No. of parking lot per household    0.086*** 
    (0.021) 
1{central heat}    -0.011 
    (0.029) 
Constant 9.447*** 9.805*** 9.409*** 9.508*** 
 (0.002) (0.101) (0.104) (0.115) 
Property FE Yes No No No 
District-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,188 12,188 12,100 11,990 
R-squared 0.97 0.57 0.76 0.77 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equation (8). The sample period is May 2008 – May 2009. 
1{along suburban line} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban 
metro station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. Post equals 1 for months after the announcement 
month November 2008. Please refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other 
controls. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
on the property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equation (2.11). The sample period is May 2008 - May 2009.
1{along suburban line} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban metro
station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. Post equals 1 for months after the announcement month
November 2008. Please refer to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition of other controls.
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the
property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 2.8: Effects of the Metro Plan, Announcement and Completion on Housing Prices
51 
 
Table 9. The Effects of the Metro Plan, Announcement and Completion on Prices 
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
1{along suburban line}*Post 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) 
1{along planned line}*Post_Plan -0.040 -0.047* -0.044 -0.045 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) 
1{along suburban line}*Post_Constr 0.048** 0.044** 0.044* 0.041* 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) 
1{along suburban line}  0.045* 0.096*** 0.098*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
1{along planned line}  0.073 0.035 0.013 
  (0.058) (0.059) (0.069) 
Post 0.299*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.249*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) 
Post_Plan 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.173*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Post_Constr 0.398*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.385*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Location and Accessibility No No No Yes 
Property Attributes No No Yes Yes 
Property FE Yes No No No 
District-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56,240 56,240 55,731 55,128 
R-squared 0.84 0.61 0.71 0.73 
 
Notes: The sample period is January 2007 – June 2011. 1{along suburban line} equals 1 if the property is 
located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban metro station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. 
1{along planned line} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest planned 
suburban station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. Post equals 1 for months after the announcement 
month November 2008. Post_Plan equals 1 for months after June 2007. Post_Constr equals 1 for months 
after December 2010.Please refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other controls. 
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the 
property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 








Notes: The sample period is January 2007 - June 2011. 1{along suburban line} equals 1 if the property is
located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban metro station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub.
1{along planned line} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest planned suburban
station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. Post equals 1 for months after the announcement month
November 2008. Post_Plan equals 1 for months after June 2007. Post_Constr equals 1 for months after
December 2010.Please refer to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition of other controls.
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the
property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneous Effects of Construction Announcement on Housing Prices
52 
 
Table 10.  Heterogeneous Effects of Construction Announcement on Prices 
Panel A: Properties that had greater than median congestion index (2007) 
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
1{along suburban line}*Post 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.036** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) 
1{along suburban line}  0.024 0.013 0.012 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.0359) 
Post -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.061*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Location and Accessibility No No No Yes 
Property Attributes No No Yes Yes 
Property FE Yes No No No 
District-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,743 5,743 5,703 5,691 
R-squared 0.97 0.54 0.76 0.77 
 
 
Panel B: Properties that had less than median congestion index (2007) 
 Dependent Variable: Log (price) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
1{along suburban line}*Post 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.004 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
1{along suburban line}  0.461** 0.278*** 0.265*** 
  (0.207) (0.0831) (0.0874) 
Post -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.051*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dist to City Center (km)  -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Location and Accessibility No No No Yes 
Property Attributes No No Yes Yes 
Property FE Yes No No No 
District-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,445 6,445 6,397 6,299 
R-squared 0.96 0.64 0.77 0.78 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equation (8). The sample period is May 2008 – May 2009. 
1{along suburban line} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban 
metro station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. Post equals 1 for months after the announcement 
month November 2008. Please refer to Table 1 for details on the construction and definition of other 
controls. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
on the property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equation (2.11). The sample period is May 2008 - May 2009.
1{along suburban line} equals 1 if the property is located with one kilometer of the nearest suburban metro
station, or it is in a suburban commercial hub. Post equals 1 for months after the announcement month
November 2008. Please refer to Table 2.2 for details on the construction and definition of other controls.
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the
property level. Time-varying coefficients are not reported due to space. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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A. Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First, consider the case in which rational investors believe that the PA is conflicted, and
therefore do not buy its report. Each of these investors votes for management with probabil-
ity 12 . Litigation-averse investors would like to buy the report given the informational gain
is larger than price of the report. With probability β the proposal passes. β is as defined in
footnote 17.
When the PA receives signal s = o and reports m = A, its profit is
pi(A|o) = β(φ+ fα− epρα) + (1− β)(φ+ fα)
= φ+ fα− βepρα
If the proposal is approved, with probability ep a loss occurs (from PA’s point of view)
and the PA incurs a reputation cost from litigation-averse investors. With probability 1− β
the proposal stalls, and the PA therefore is not liable. When the PA receives signal s = o
and reports m = O, it loses its corporate client. Its profit is
pi(O|o) = fα
The PA always reports m = A when pi(A|o) > pi(O|o) which yields the condition φ >
βepρα. The PA reports truthfully when φ < βepρα. Note that when receiving signal s = a
the PA will not be conflicted because recommending against management in this case does
not yield additional profit.
Now we pin down fee conditions. With probability 12 , the PA receives an “o” signal.
When φ > βepρα, it reports m = A with probability 1. With probability β the proposal
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passes and leads to a loss with probability ep. So with probability 12βep litigation-averse
investors suffer a loss of c from clients. The expected total cost of purchasing the report is
f + 12βepc. Similarly, if a litigation-averse investor deviates to vote based on ex ante belief,
with probability 12
1
2 it votes for an “o” proposal. The cost of making a wrong vote therefore
is 12
1




2βpC − 12βepc. Since we normalize
c = 0, f = 12
1
2βpC. Realizing this, a rational investor does not want to deviate to buy the
report. The expected total cost of buying the report is f + 12βepC˜, which is greater than the
cost of voting based on ex ante belief 12
1
2βpC˜. Note that e >
1
2 .
Second, when φ < βepρα, assume there is an equilirbium in which the PA reports truth-
fully and only litigation-averse investors buy the report. Litigation-averse investors under-
stand that they will not incur a cost following the PA since the PA is truthful. When
s = o,m = O, the expected cost is 12γepC if a litigation-averse investor votes based on ex
ante belief. When s = a,m = A, the expected cost of voting based on ex ante belief is
1
2β(1 − e)pC. Thus the PA charges a fee f = 12 [12γepC + 12β(1 − e)pC]. The corresponding




2β(1− e)pC˜]. In the general case in which C and
C˜ are close enough, the PA will lower its fee to woo both types of investors in order to boost
its profit. This therefore can not be an equilibrium.
Finally, we show that there is another equilibrium in which both types of investors buy
PA’s report. Now If the PA receives signal s = o and reports m = A, its profit is
pi(A|o) = φ+ f − epρ
If the PA receives signal s = o and reports m = O, it loses the corporate client. Its profit is
pi(O|o) = f
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So the PA reports truthfully when pi(A|o) < pi(O|o) which yields the condition φ < epρ.
Now consider the fee condition. If a rational investor deviates and does not buy the PA’s
report, it will vote for management with probability 12 . Since all other investors vote with
the PA, the voting result will not change. The cost of deviating is 12
1
2(1 − e)pC˜. Similarly,
if a litigation-averse investor deviates, the cost is 12
1




Proof of Lemma 1
First consider the case where α < 12 . Rational investors are the majority. They will determine
vote outcomes if they follow PA 2. For a rational investor, voting based on ex ante belief
is costly only when PA 2’s signal s2 is “a” because the proposal passes. This happens with
probability 12 , and the investor votes for management with probability
1
2 . When s2 = a, the
probability that a loss occurs is (1− e)p, so cost for the rational investor is 12 12(1− e)pC˜. If
PA 2 only retains rational investors, it sets fee f2 = 12
1
2(1− e)pC˜.
Now PA 2 wants to lower its fee to attract litigation-averse investors as well. Let the
lowest fee PA 2 is willing to charge be f˜2. This fee makes PA 2 indifferent towards serving
both types of investors or just rational investors. It leads to the following relation
f˜2 ·N = f2 · (1− α)N
Rearranging, we obtain f˜2 = (1 − α)12 12(1 − e)pC˜. However, PA 1 has an incentive to
charge a fee f1 = f˜2 −  where  is a small number. At this price, litigation-averse investors
find it less expensive to purchase PA 1’s report. Recall that for litigation-averse investors,
following PA 1 does not incur a cost imposed by clients (c is normalized to 0). For these
investors, the cost of voting based on ex ante belief is 12
1
2(1− e)pC which will be larger than
f1, in the general case when C and C˜ are close. Therefore litigation-averse investors will
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switch to PA 1.
Anticipating this, PA 2 raises its fee to f2 = 12
1
2(1− e)pC˜ to serve only rational investors.
In turn, PA 1 sets its fee f1 = min[12
1
2(1 − e)pC, 12 12(1 − e)pC˜] to serve litigation-averse
investors.
The case where α > 12 is similar. Fees charged by both PAs are derived in Proposition 4.
We therefore have shown that there exists no equilibrium in which both types of investors
buy a report from PA 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
This is the case where α < 12 . Rational investors will determine the vote outcome if they
follow PA 2. I show there exists an equilibrium in which litigation-averse investors buy PA
1’s report and rational investors purchase PA 2’s report.
When s1 = o,m1 = A, s2 = a,m2 = A, all investors vote for the management, and the
proposal therefore passes. PA 1 does not incur a reputation cost when a loss occurs because
PAs’ recommendations are the same. It is difficult to determine which PA is conflicted. The
profit for PA 1 is
pi1(A|o) = φ+ f1α
When s1 = o,m1 = A, s2 = o,m2 = O, litigation-averse investors vote for the proposal
while rational investors vote against it. Since there are more rational ones (α < 12), the
proposal fails to pass. Again PA 1 does not suffer a reputation cost. The profit for PA 1 is
pi1(A|o) = φ+ f1α
When s1 = o,m1 = O, no matter what m2 is, PA 1 does not incur a reputation cost
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because it is truthful. The profit for PA 1 is
pi1(O|o) = f1α
Since pi1(A|o) > pi1(O|o), PA 1 always reports m1 = A.
Now we pin down the fee conditions. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, PA 2 raises
its fee to f2 = 12
1
2(1 − e)pC˜ to serve only the rational investors. PA 1 sets its fee f1 =
min[12
1
2(1− e)pC, 12 12(1− e)pC˜] to serve the litigation-averse investors. Note that litigation-
averse investors will not deviate to vote based on their ex ante belief because the cost of
doing so is 12
1
2(1− e)pC, which is larger or equal to f1.
Proof of Proposition 4
This is the case where α > 12 . Litigation-averse investors will determine the vote outcome.
I show there exists an equilibrium where litigation-averse investors buy PA 1’s report and
rational investors purchase PA 2’s report.
When s1 = o,m1 = A, s2 = a,m2 = A, all investors vote for management, and the
proposal therefore passes. Again, PA 1 does not suffer a reputation cost when a loss occurs
because PAs’ recommendations are the same. The profit for PA 1 is
pi1(A|o) = φ+ f1α
When s1 = o,m1 = A, s2 = o,m2 = O, litigation-averse investors vote for the proposal
while rational investors vote against it. Since there are more litigation-averse ones (α > 12),
the proposal is approved. The probability that the state is “o” equals e2
e2+(1−e)2 . For simplicity,
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define this probability as q. Now PA 1 suffers a reputation cost. The profit for PA 1 is
pi1(A|o) = φ+ f1α− qp˜ρ1α
The expected profit for PA 1 is the weighted average profits under these two scenarios:
E[pi1(A|o)] = φ+ f1α− 12qp˜ρ1α
When s1 = o,m1 = O, no matter what m2 is, PA 1 does not suffer a reputation loss
because it is truthful. The profit for PA 1 is
pi1(O|o) = f1α
So the PA always reports m1 = A when E[pi1(A|o)] > pi1(O|o) which yields the condition
φ > 12qp˜ρ1α.
Now we pin down the fee conditions. Since PA always recommends m1 = A, the proposal
will be approved for sure. If a rational investor deviates and votes for the management based
on ex ante belief, then with probability 12
1
2 it votes for an “o” proposal. The cost of making
a wrong vote is 12
1




2pC˜ to serve rational investors. PA 1






2pC˜] to serve the litigation-averse investors.
Next I show that when φ < 12qp˜ρ1α, the fee conditions are identical to those in Proposition
3. PA 2 sets the fee to f2 = 12
1
2(1− e)pC˜ to serve only the rational investors. PA 1 sets its
fee f1 = min[12
1
2(1− e)pC, 12 12(1− e)pC˜] to serve the litigation-averse investors.
Other Equilibria Under Competition
Recall that if litigation-averse investors obtain PA 1 and follow its voting recommendation,
the litigation cost is c < C when the PA is found out to be conflicted. Note that we normalize
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c to zero in the main text. Here I do not make this assumption. Litigation-averse investors
now may have an incentive to purchase an additional report from PA 2. The reason is that if
an institutional investor buys reports from both PAs, it may be more difficult for its clients
to win a lawsuit when a loss occurs. Because the investor could argue that she acted in good
faith by subscribing to both reports in order to make the best judgment. In practice, some
institutional investors subscribe to multiple PAs in order to make a more informed vote.
Note that in the case of conflicting reports, litigation-averse investors are assumed to
follow PA 1’s recommendation. This is because PA 1 has been in business longer, and is
regarded as the more established advisor. It is natural for litigation-averse investors facing
conflicting recommendations to follow its recommendation. For simplicity, I assume that
litigation-averse investors are immune from clients’ lawsuits when obtaining both PAs. I
proceed to derive the following symmetric equilibrium under each informational regime:
Proposition 5 When α < 12 , the equilibrium of the subgame is:
1. PA 1 always reports m1 = A, and sets f1 = 12
1
2(1 − e)pC − 12 12 12pc. Litigation-averse
investors buy both reports and rational investors buy only PA 2’s report. PA 2 reports









Proof. This is the case where α < 12 . Rational investors will determine the vote outcome
if they follow PA 2. I show that there exists an equilibrium where litigation-averse investors
buy both reports and rational investors buy only PA 2’s report. The proof is identical to
the proof of Proposition 3 except the fee conditions. PA 1 always reports m1 = A.
We now pin down the fee conditions. For a litigation-averse investor, voting based on
ex ante belief is costly only when s2 = a because the proposal passes. This happens with
probability 12 , and the investor votes for the management with probability
1
2 . When s2 = a,





When the litigation-averse investor only buys a report from PA 1, she incurs a cost when
s1 = o, s2 = a, and the probability that the state is “o” equals e(1−e)e(1−e)+(1−e)e =
1
2 . So the total





When the litigation-averse investor buys both reports, she is immune from any costs
imposed by her clients, and total cost is f1 + f2. Then PA 1 will charge a fee f1 = 12
1
2(1 −
e)pC − 12 12 12pc. PA 2 sets f2 ≤ 12 12 12pc.
For a rational investor, voting based on ex ante belief is costly only when s2 = a because
the proposal passes. The cost is 12
1
2(1− e)pC˜. Following PA 2 only leads to total cost f2. So









It is optimal for litigation-averse investors to purchase both reports because this mini-
mizes the cost. Rational investors will buy only PA 2’s report because PA 1 is conflicted.
Proposition 6 When α > 12 , the equilibrium of the subgame is:




2pC − 12 12pc. Litigation-
averse investors buy both reports and rational investors buy only PA 2’s report. PA 2











2(1 − e)pC. Litigation-averse
investors purchase PA 1’s report, and rational investors buy PA 2’s report. PA 2 is
truthful and sets f2 = min[12
1
2(1− e)pC, 12 12(1− e)pC˜].
Proof This is the case where α > 12 . Litigation-averse investors will determine the
vote outcome. I show there exists an equilibrium where PA 1 always reports m1 = A, and
litigation-averse investors buy both reports and rational investors buy only PA 2’s report.
The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 4 except the fee conditions.
Now we pin down the fee conditions. When PA 1 always recommends m1 = A, the
proposal will be approved for sure. If a litigation-averse investor deviates and votes for the
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management based on ex ante belief, then with probability 12
1
2 it votes for an “o” proposal.
The cost of making a wrong vote is 12
1
2pC. If a litigation-averse investor buys only a report
from PA 1, the total cost is f1 + 12
1
2pc. The total cost is f1 +f2 if she purchases both reports.
Therefore PA 1 sets f1 = 12
1
2pC − 12 12pc and PA 2 sets f2 ≤ 12 12pc.
Since rational investors expect that PA 1 is conflicted, they purchase only PA 2’s report.
The cost of deviating to vote based on ex ante belief is 12
1









Next I derive the fee conditions when φ < 12qp˜ρ1α. PA 1 will be truthful in this case. For
a litigation-averse investor, deviating to vote based on ex ante belief is costly when s1 = a.
The associated cost is 12
1
2(1 − e)pC. Since now PA 1 is truthful, litigation-averse investors
purchase only its report. PA 1 sets f1 = 12
1
2(1 − e)pC. Similarly, the cost of deviating for
rational investors is 12
1
2(1− e)pC˜. Therefore PA 2 sets f2 = min[12 12(1− e)pC, 12 12(1− e)pC˜].
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B.  Empirical Appendix 
Table B.1. Robustness checks: Convergence of recommendations during 2004-2011 
The dependent variable is fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations minus fraction of Glass Lewis’s “For” 
recommendations at the firm level. All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations less fraction of 
Glass Lewis’s “for” recommendations at firm level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GL’s mkt share (# of clients) -0.140*** -0.163*** -0.177***    
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.068)    
GL’s mkt share (# firms covered)    -0.145*** -0.169*** -0.183*** 
    (0.052) (0.059) (0.070) 
Log assets -0.021** -0.029*** -0.030** -0.021** -0.029*** -0.030** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) 
Ind-adj ROA -0.022 -0.075* -0.065 -0.022 -0.076* -0.065 
 (0.018) (0.046) (0.067) (0.018) (0.046) (0.067) 
Prior-year stock return 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) 
Leverage   0.072*   0.072* 
   (0.042)   (0.042) 
Capex/Assets   0.213   0.213 
   (0.136)   (0.136) 
Abnormal exec. compensation ($m)  -0.0004 -0.001  -0.0004 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 
∆Executive compensation YOY  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Cash/total compensation  0.025 0.017  0.025 0.017 
  (0.022) (0.028)  (0.022) (0.028) 
Classified board*poison pill   -0.016   -0.016 
   (0.014)   (0.014) 
Board size   0.001   0.001 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Ratio of independent directors   -0.043   -0.043 
   (0.043)   (0.043) 
Institutional holdings   -0.012   -0.012 
   (0.046)   (0.046) 
Management holdings   0.026   0.027 
   (0.062)   (0.062) 
Constant 0.269*** 0.369*** 0.386*** 0.280*** 0.382*** 0.400*** 
 (0.060) (0.088) (0.132) (0.061) (0.089) (0.132) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Observations 17,732 10,859 7,929 17,732 10,859 7,929 
R-squared 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.33 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of ISS’s “For” recommendations minus fraction of Glass Lewis’
“For” recommendations at the firm level. All independent variables are defined as in Table 1.1. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table B.2. Robustness checks: Direction of convergence in recommendations (2004-2011) 
The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the firm level 
(ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”). All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust 
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of differing recommendations at firm level (ISS 
“For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GL’s mkt share (# of clients) -0.500*** -0.465*** -0.427***    
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.046)    
GL’s mkt share (# firms covered)    -1.120*** -1.042*** -0.732*** 
    (0.063) (0.081) (0.103) 
Log assets -0.031*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.031*** -0.047*** -0.044*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) 
Ind-adj ROA -0.027 -0.132*** -0.063 -0.027 -0.132*** -0.063 
 (0.017) (0.044) (0.059) (0.017) (0.044) (0.059) 
Prior-year stock return 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Leverage   0.096***   0.096*** 
   (0.036)   (0.036) 
Capex/Assets   0.093   0.093 
   (0.120)   (0.120) 
Abnormal exec. compensation ($m)  -0.0003 -0.001  -0.0003 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
∆Executive compensation YOY  -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Cash/total compensation  0.016 0.018  0.016 0.018 
  (0.019) (0.024)  (0.019) (0.024) 
Classified board*poison pill   -0.016   -0.016 
   (0.012)   (0.012) 
Board size   0.001   0.002 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Ratio of independent directors   -0.063*   -0.063* 
   (0.038)   (0.038) 
Institutional holdings   -0.072   -0.072 
   (0.049)   (0.049) 
Management holdings   0.043   0.043 
   (0.051)   (0.051) 
Constant 0.532*** 0.661*** 0.632*** 0.856*** 0.963*** 0.844*** 
 (0.055) (0.086) (0.114) (0.053) (0.083) (0.108) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Observations 17,864 10,803 7,607 17,864 10,803 7,607 
R-squared 0.48 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.46 0.35 
 
 Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the
firm level (ISS “For,” Glass Lewis “Against/Withhold”). All independent variables are defined as in Table
1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table B.3. Robustness checks: Direction of convergence in recommendations (2004-2011) 
The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at the firm level 
(ISS “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis “For”). All independent variables are defined as in Table I. Robust 
standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: fraction of differing recommendations at firm level (ISS 
“Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis “For”) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GL’s mkt share (# of clients) -0.100*** -0.136*** -0.129***    
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.032)    
GL’s mkt share (# firms covered)    -0.104*** -0.141*** -0.133*** 
    (0.024) (0.027) (0.033) 
Log assets -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ind-adj ROA 0.005 0.012 0.052 0.005 0.012 0.052 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.036) (0.010) (0.026) (0.036) 
Prior-year stock return -0.003 -0.003 -0.009** -0.003 -0.003 -0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Leverage   0.015   0.015 
   (0.022)   (0.022) 
Capex/Assets   -0.165**   -0.165** 
   (0.073)   (0.073) 
Abnormal exec. compensation ($m)  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
∆Executive compensation YOY  0.001*** 0.001**  0.001*** 0.001** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Cash/total compensation  -0.009 -0.011  -0.009 -0.011 
  (0.011) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.014) 
Classified board*poison pill   -0.007   -0.007 
   (0.007)   (0.007) 
Board size   0.001   0.001 
   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Ratio of independent directors   -0.030   -0.030 
   (0.022)   (0.022) 
Institutional holdings   0.003   0.003 
   (0.024)   (0.024) 
Management holdings   -0.004   -0.004 
   (0.033)   (0.033) 
Constant 0.075** 0.050 0.107* 0.075** 0.050 0.107* 
 (0.030) (0.042) (0.062) (0.030) (0.042) (0.062) 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Fiscal-year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year trend √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Observations 17,732 10,859 7,929 17,732 10,859 7,929 
R-squared 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.46 0.37 0.37 
 
 Notes: The dependent variable is fraction of differing recommendations for management proposals at thefirm level (ISS “Against/Withhold,” Glass Lewis “For”). All independent variables are defined as in Table
1.1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
